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Abstract
The recent economic crisis highlights the role of ￿nancial markets in allowing
economic agents, including prominent banks, to speculate on the future returns
of di⁄erent ￿nancial assets, such as mortgage-backed securities. This paper in-
troduces a dynamic general equilibrium model with aggregate shocks, potentially
incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents to investigate this role of ￿nancial
markets. In addition to their risk aversion and endowments, agents di⁄er in their
beliefs about the future exogenous states (aggregate and idiosyncratic) of the
economy. This di⁄erence in beliefs induces them to take large bets under fric-
tionless complete ￿nancial markets, which enable agents to leverage their future
wealth. Consequently, as hypothesized by Friedman (1953), under complete mar-
kets, agents with incorrect beliefs will eventually be driven out of the markets. In
this case, they also have no in￿ uence on asset prices and real investment in the
long run. In contrast, I show that under incomplete markets generated by collat-
eral constraints, agents with heterogeneous (potentially incorrect) beliefs survive
in the long run and their speculative activities permanently drive up asset price
volatility and real investment volatility. I also show that collateral constraints
are always binding even if the supply of collateral assets endogenously responds
to their price. I use this framework to study the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of
regulations and the distribution of endowments on leverage, asset price volatility
and investment. Lastly, the analytical tools developed in this framework enable
me to prove the existence of the "generalized" recursive equilibrium in Krusell
and Smith (1998) with a ￿nite number of agents.
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11 Introduction
The events leading to the ￿nancial crisis of 2007-2008 have highlighted the importance of
belief heterogeneity and how ￿nancial markets create opportunities for agents with di⁄erent
beliefs to leverage up and speculate. Several investment and commercial banks invested
heavily in mortgage-backed securities, which subsequently su⁄ered large declines in value.
At the same time, some hedge funds pro￿ted from the securities by short-selling them.
One reason for why there has been relatively little attention, in economic theory, paid to
heterogeneity of beliefs and how these interact with ￿nancial markets is the market selection
hypothesis. The hypothesis, originally formulated by Friedman (1953), claims that in the
long run, there should be limited di⁄erences in beliefs because agents with incorrect beliefs
will be taken advantage of and eventually be driven out the markets by those with the correct
belief. Therefore, agents with incorrect beliefs will have no in￿ uence on economic activity
in the long run. This hypothesis has recently been formalized and extended in recent work
by Blume and Easley (2006) and Sandroni (2000). However these papers assume ￿nancial
markets are complete and this assumption plays a central role in allowing agents to pledge
all their wealth.
In this paper, I present a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which agents di⁄er
in their beliefs but markets are endogenously incomplete because of collateral constraints.
Collateral constraints limit the extent to which agents can pledge their future wealth and
ensure that agents with incorrect beliefs never lose so much as to be driven out of the market.
Consequently, all agents, regardless of their beliefs, survive in the long run and continue to
trade on the basis of their heterogeneous beliefs. This leads to additional leverage and asset
price volatility (relative to a model with homogeneous beliefs or relative to the limit of the
complete markets economy).
The framework introduced in this paper also enables a comprehensive study of how
the survival of heterogeneous beliefs and the structure of ￿nancial markets a⁄ect aggregate
capital accumulation in the long run. I also use this framework to study the impact of
di⁄erent types of regulations on welfare, asset price volatility and investment. The dynamic
general equilibrium approach adopted here is central for many of these investigations. Since
it permits the use of well-speci￿ed collateral constraints, it enables me to look at whether
agents with incorrect beliefs will be eventually driven out of the market. It allows leverage
and endogenous investment (supply of assets) and it enables me to characterize the e⁄ects
of di⁄erent types of policies on welfare and economic ￿ uctuations.
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets I present in
this paper is not only useful for the analysis of the e⁄ects of heterogeneity in the survival of
agents with di⁄erent beliefs, but also includes well-known models as special cases, including
recent models, such as those in Kubler and Schmedders (2003), Fostel and Geanakoplos
(2008) and Geanakoplos (2009), as well as more classic models including those in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and Krusell and Smith (1998). For instance, this model allows for capital
accumulation with adjustment costs in the same model in Krusell and Smith (1998) and
shows the existence of a "generalized" recursive equilibrium. This equilibrium existence has
been an open question in the literature. The generality is useful in making this framework
eventually applicable to a range of questions on the interaction between ￿nancial markets,
heterogeneity, aggregate capital accumulation and aggregate activity.
2More speci￿cally, I study an economy in dynamic general equilibrium with aggregate
shocks and heterogeneous, in￿nitely-lived agents.1 Aggregate shocks follow a Markov process.
Consumers di⁄er in terms of their beliefs on the transition matrix of the Markov process (for
simplicity, these belief di⁄erences are never updated as there is no learning; in other words
agents in this economy agree to disagree).2 There is a unique ￿nal good used for consumption
and investment, and several real and ￿nancial assets. There are two classes of real assets: one
class of assets, which I call trees, are in ￿xed supply and the other class of assets are in elastic
supply. Only assets in elastic supply can be produced using the ￿nal good. The total quantity
of ￿nal good used in the production of real assets is the aggregate real investment. I assume
that agents cannot short sell either type of assets. Assets in elastic supply are important to
model real investment (asset production) and also to show that collateral constraints do not
arise because of an arti￿cially limited supply of assets.
Incomplete (￿nancial) markets are introduced by assuming that all loans have to use
￿nancial assets as collateralized promises as in Geanakoplos and Zame (2002). Selling a
￿nancial asset is equivalent to borrowing and in this case, agents need to put up some
real assets as collateral. Loans are non-recourse and there is no penalty for defaulting.
Consequently, whenever the face value of the security is higher than the value of its collateral,
the seller of the security can choose to default without further consequences. In this case, the
security buyer seizes the collateral instead of receiving the face value of the security. I refer
to equilibria of the economy with these ￿nancial assets as incomplete markets equilibria since
the presence of collateral constrains introduces endogenous incomplete markets. Several key
results involve the comparison of incomplete markets equilibria to the standard competitive
equilibrium with complete markets.
Households (consumers) can di⁄er in many aspects, such as risk-aversion and endow-
ments. Most importantly, they di⁄er in their beliefs concerning the transition matrix govern-
ing transitions across the exogenous states of the economy. Given the consumers￿subjective
expectations, they choose their consumption and real and ￿nancial asset holdings to max-
imize their intertemporal expected utility. In particular, the consumers￿perceptions about
the future value of each unit of real asset, including future rental prices and future resale
value, determine the consumers￿demand for new units of real assets. This demand, in turn,
determines how many new units of real assets are produced. Hence, demand determines real
investment in a fashion similar to the neoclassical Tobin￿ s Q theory of investment.
The framework delivers several results. The ￿rst set of results, already mentioned above,
is related to the survival of agents with incorrect beliefs. As in Blume and Easley (2006)
and Sandroni (2000), with perfect, complete markets, in the long run, only agents with
correct beliefs survive. Their consumption is bounded from below by a strictly positive
number. Agents with incorrect beliefs see their consumption go to zero, as uncertainties
realize. However, in any incomplete markets equilibrium, every agent survives because of
1In￿nite horizon and in￿nitely-lived agents allow the use of sationary equilibria and the analysis of short
run versus long run.
2Alternatively, one could assume that even though agents di⁄er with respect to their initial beliefs,
they partially update them. In this case, similar results would apply provided that the learning process is
su¢ ciently slow (which will be the case when individuals start with relatively ￿rm priors). In the paper, I
also show how to incorporate learning into the framework.
3no-default-penalty condition.3 When agents lose their bets, they can simply walk away from
their collateral while keeping their current and future endowments to come back and trade
in the ￿nancial markets in the same period.4 They cannot do so under complete markets
because they can commit to delivering all their future endowments.5
More importantly, the survival or disappearance of agents with incorrect beliefs a⁄ects
asset price volatility. To focus on asset price volatility, I consider economies with only ￿xed-
supply real assets, i.e., Lucas trees. Under complete markets, agents with incorrect beliefs
will eventually be driven out of the markets in the long run. The economies converge to
economies with homogeneous beliefs, i.e., the correct beliefs. Markets completeness then
implies that asset prices in these economies are independent of past realizations of aggregate
shocks. In addition, asset prices are the net present discounted values of the dividend
processes with appropriate discount factors. As a result, asset price volatility is proportional
to the volatility of dividends if the aggregate endowment, or equivalently the equilibrium
stochastic discount factor, only varies by a limited amount over time and across states.
These properties no longer hold under incomplete markets. Given that agents with incorrect
beliefs survive in the long run, they exert permanent in￿ uence on asset prices. Asset prices
are not only determined by the aggregate shocks as in the complete markets case, but
also by the evolution of the wealth distribution across agents. This also implies that asset
prices are history-dependent as the realizations of past aggregate shocks a⁄ect the current
wealth distribution. The additional dependence on the wealth distribution raises asset price
volatility under incomplete markets above the volatility level under complete markets.
I establish this result more formally using a special case in which the aggregate endow-
ment is constant and the dividend processes are I.I.D. Under complete markets, asset prices
are asymptotically constant. Asset price volatility, therefore, goes to zero in the long run.
In contrast, asset price volatility stays well above zero under incomplete markets as the
wealth distribution changes constantly, and asset price depends on the wealth distribution.
Although this example is extreme, numerical simulations show that its insight carries over
to less special cases. In general, long-run asset price volatility is higher under incomplete
markets than under complete markets.
The volatility comparison is di⁄erent in the short run, however. Depending on the dis-
tribution of endowments, short run asset price volatility can be greater or smaller under
complete or incomplete markets. This happens because the wealth distribution matters for
asset prices under both complete markets and incomplete markets in the short run. This
formulation also helps clarify the long-run volatility comparison. In the long run, under
complete markets, the wealth distribution becomes degenerate as it concentrates only on
agents with correct beliefs. In contrast, under incomplete markets, the wealth distribution
remains non-degenerate in the long run and a⁄ects asset price volatility permanently. How-
ever, the wealth of agents with incorrect beliefs may remain low as they tend to lose their
bets. Strikingly, under incomplete markets and when the set of actively traded ￿nancial as-
sets is endogenous, the poorer the agents with incorrect beliefs are, the more they leverage to
3This is a sepcial case of no limited commitment.
4This is in contrast to the usual limited commitment literature where agents are assumed to be banned
from trading in ￿nancial markets after their defaults.
5Even though the survival mechanism here is relatively simple (but also realistic), characterizing equilib-
rium variable such as asset prices and leverage in this environment is not an easy exercise.
4buy assets. High leverage generates large ￿ uctuations in their wealth, and as a consequence,
large ￿ uctuations in asset prices.
The results concerning volatility of asset prices also translate into volatility of real in-
vestment. Consequently, real investment under incomplete markets exhibits higher volatility
than under complete markets. To illustrate this result, I choose a special case in which the
aggregate endowment and productivity are constant over time. Under complete markets,
as economies converge to economies with homogeneous beliefs, capital levels converge to
their steady-state levels. Investments levels are therefore approximately constant; invest-
ment volatility is approximately zero. In contrast, under incomplete markets investment
volatility remains strictly positive because it depends on the wealth distribution and the
wealth distribution constantly changes as aggregate shocks hit the economies.
It is also useful to highlight the role of dynamic general equilibrium for some results
mentioned above. In particular, the in￿nite horizon nature of the framework allows a com-
prehensive analysis of short-run and long-run behavior of asset price volatility. Such an
analysis is not possible in ￿nite horizon economies, including Geanakoplos￿ s important study
on the e⁄ects of heterogeneous beliefs on leverage and crises. For example, in page 35 of
Geanakoplos (2009), he observes similar volatility as the economy moves from incomplete
to complete markets. In my model, the ￿rst set of results described above shows that the
similarity holds only in the short run. The long run dynamics of asset price volatility totally
di⁄ers from complete to incomplete markets. In my model, the results are also based on
insights in Blume and Easley (2006) and Sandroni (2000) regarding the disappearance of
agents with incorrect beliefs. However, these authors do not focus on the e⁄ect of their
disappearance on asset price or asset price volatility.
The dynamic general equilibrium of the economy also captures the "debt-de￿ation" chan-
nel as in Mendoza (2010), which models a small open economy. The economy in my paper
also follows two di⁄erent dynamics in di⁄erent times, "normal business cycles" and "debt-
de￿ation cycles," depending on whether the collateral constraints are binding for any of the
agents. In a debt-de￿ ation cycle, the borrowing constraint binds. Then, when a bad shock
hits the economy, the constrained agents are forced to liquidate their physical asset hold-
ings. This ￿re sale of the physical assets reduces the price of these assets and tightens the
constraints further and starting a vicious circle of falling asset prices. This paper shows that
the debt-de￿ ation channel still operates when we are in a closed-economy with endogenous
interest rate, as opposed to exogenous interest rates as in Mendoza (2010) or Kocherlakota
(2000).
The second set of results that follows from this framework concerns collateral shortages.
I show that collateral constraints will eventually be binding for every agent in complete
markets equilibrium provided that the face values of the ￿nancial assets with collateral span
the complete set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities. Intuitively, if this was not the
case, the unconstrained asset holdings would imply arbitrarily low levels of consumption at
some state of the world for every agent, contradicting the result that consumption is bounded
from below. In other words, there are always shortages of collateral even if I allow for an
elastic supply of collateral. This result sharply contrasts with those obtained when agents
have homogenous beliefs but still have reasons to trade due to di⁄erences in endowments or
utility functions. In these cases, if the economy has enough collateral, or can produce it,
then collateral constraints may not bind and the complete markets allocation is achieved.
5Heterogeneous beliefs, therefore, guarantee collateral shortages.
Another immediate implication of these results concerns Pareto ine¢ ciency of incomplete
markets equilibria. Incomplete markets equilibria are Pareto-suboptimal whenever agents
strictly di⁄er in their beliefs. This can be seen for the results that under complete markets
equilibria, some agent￿ s consumption will come arbitrarily close to zero while this never
happens under incomplete markets. Intuitively, under complete markets agents pledged
their future income, while collateral constraints put limits on such transactions. While
allocations in which some agents experience very low levels of consumption may not be
attractive according to some social welfare criteria, the equilibrium under complete markets
is Pareto optimal under the subjective expectations of the agents. This result also implies
that there is the possibility for Pareto improving regulations. However, given that this result
is about unconstrained Pareto-e¢ ciency, Pareto improving regulations might involve altering
the incomplete markets structure.6
The above mentioned results are derived under the presumption that incomplete mar-
kets equilibria exist. However, establishing existence of incomplete markets equilibria is
generally a challenging task. The third set of results establishes the existence of incomplete
markets equilibria with a stationary structure. In their seminal paper, Geanakoplos and
Zame (2002) show that, with collateral constraints, the standard existence proof a la Debreu
(1959) applies. Kubler and Schmedders (2003) extend the existence proof to in￿nite horizon
economies. I use the insights from these works to show the existence of incomplete markets
equilibria in ￿nite and in￿nite horizon economies with production and capital accumulation.
Following Kubler and Schmedders (2003), I look for Markov equilibria, i.e., in which equi-
librium prices and quantities depend only on the distribution of normalized ￿nancial wealth
and the total quantities of assets with elastic supply. I show the existence of the equilibria
under standard assumptions. I also develop an algorithm, based on the algorithm in Kubler
and Schmedders (2003), to compute these equilibria. The same algorithm can be used to
compute the complete markets equilibrium benchmark. One direct corollary of the existence
theorem is that a "generalized" recursive equilibrium in Krusell and Smith (1998) with a
￿nite number of agents exists.78
The fourth set of results attempts to answer some normative questions in this framework.
Simple and extreme forms of ￿nancial regulations such as shutting down ￿nancial markets are
not bene￿cial. Using the algorithm described above, I provide numerical results illustrating
that these regulations fail to reduce asset price volatility and moreover they may also reduce
the welfare of all agents because of the restrictions they impose on mutually bene￿cial trades.
In particular, the intuition for the greater volatility under such regulations is that, when the
collateral constraints are binding, regulations restrict the demand for assets. Therefore asset
6For a two-period version of my model, the concept of constrained Pareto-ine¢ ciency due to Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986) can be checked. In some cases, the economy can be constrained ine¢ cient in this
sense, due to pecuniary externalities.
7The calibrating term "generalized" comes from the fact that the mapping from current to future wealth
distribution can be multi-valued as opposed to single-valued in Krusell and Smith (1998).
8Allowing for only an abitrary ￿nite number of agents instead of a continuum of agents as in Krusell
and Smith (1998) does not necessarily make the existence proof simpler given the aggregate shocks to the
economy. Moreover, in the computational part of the paper, the authors also end up using the version of
their model with a ￿nite number of agents.
6prices are lower than they are in unregulated economies. Agents, however, will eventually
save their way out of the constrained regime, at which point, asset prices will become compa-
rable to the unregulated levels. Movements between constrained and unconstrained regimes
create high asset price volatility. These results suggest that Pareto-improving or volatil-
ity reducing regulations must be sophisticated, for example, incorporating state-dependent
regulations.
This paper is related to the growing literature studying collateral constraints, started
with a series of papers by John Geanakoplos. The dynamic analysis of incomplete markets is
closely related to Kubler and Schmedders (2003). They pioneer the introduction of ￿nancial
markets with collateral constraints into a dynamic general equilibrium model with aggregate
shocks and heterogeneous agents. There are two main technical contributions of this paper
relative to Kubler and Schmedders (2003). The ￿rst is to introduce heterogeneous beliefs
using Radner (1972) rational expectations equilibrium concept: even though agents assign
di⁄erent probabilities to the aggregate shocks, they agree on the equilibrium outcomes, in-
cluding prices and quantities, once a shock is realized. This rational expectations concept
di⁄ers from the standard rational expectation concept, such as the one used in Lucas and
Prescott (1971), in which subjective probabilities should coincide with the true conditional
probabilities given all the available information. The second is to introduce capital accu-
mulation and production in a tractable way. Capital accumulation or real investment is
modelled through intermediate asset producers with convex adjustment costs that convert
old units of assets into new units of assets using ￿nal good.9 The analysis of e¢ ciency is
related to Kilenthong (2009) and Kilenthong and Townsend (2009). They examine a similar
but static environment.
My paper is also related to the literature on the e⁄ect of heterogeneous beliefs on asset
prices studied in Xiong and Yan (2009) and Cogley and Sargent (2008). These authors,
however, consider only complete markets. The survival of irrational traders is studied Long,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann
(1991) but they do not have a fully dynamic framework to study the long run survival of the
traders.
Related to the survival of agents with incorrect beliefs, Coury and Sciubba (2005) and
Beker and Chattopadhyay (2009) suggest a mechanism for agents￿survival based on explicit
debt constraints as in Magill and Quinzii (1994). These authors do not consider the e⁄ects
of the agents￿survival on asset prices. My framework is tractable enough for a simultaneous
analysis of survival and its e⁄ects on asset prices and investment. Beker and Espino (2010)
has a similar survival mechanism to mine based on the limited commitment framework in
Alvarez and Jermann (2000). However, my approach to asset pricing is di⁄erent because
asset prices are computed explicitly as a function of wealth distribution. Moreover, my
approach also allows a comprehensive study of asset-speci￿c leverage. Kogan, Ross, Wang,
and Wester￿eld (2006) explore yet another survival mechanism but use complete markets
instead.
Simsek (2009b) also studies the e⁄ects of belief heterogeneity on asset prices. He assumes
exogenous wealth distributions to investigate the question whether heterogeneous beliefs
9Lorenzoni and Walentin (2009) models capital accumulation with adjustment cost using used capital
markets. Through asset producers, I assume markets for both used and new capital.
7a⁄ect asset prices. In contrast, I study the e⁄ects of the endogenous wealth distribution
on asset prices as well as asset price volatility. Simsek (2009a) focuses on consumption
volatility. He shows that as markets become more complete, consumption becomes more
volatile as agents can speculate more. My ￿rst set of results suggests that this comparative
statics only holds in the short run. In the long run, the reverse statement holds due to
market selection.
When capital accumulation is introduced, the model in this paper is a generalization of
Krusell and Smith (1998) with ￿nancial markets and adjustment costs. In particular, the
existence theorem 2 shows that a recursive equilibrium in Krusell and Smith (1998) exists.
Krusell and Smith (1998) derives numerically such an equilibrium, but they do not formally
show its existence. My paper is also related to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), although I provide
a microfoundation for the ￿nancial constraint (3) in their paper using the endogeneity of the
set of actively traded ￿nancial assets.
At the time of the ￿rst draft of this paper in 2009, I was not aware of the recent papers that
discuss some issues related to the ones I consider in this paper. Brumm, Grill, Kubler, and
Schmedders (2011) show the importance of collateral requirements on asset price volatility
in a similar model but with two trees and Epstein-Zin recursive preferences. Kubler and
Schmedders (2011) show the importance of beliefs heterogeneity and wealth distribution on
asset prices in a model with overlapping-generations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follow. In section 2, I present the general model of
an endowment economy and preliminary analysis of survival, asset price volatility under the
complete markets benchmark as well as under incomplete markets. In section 3, I de￿ne and
show the existence of incomplete markets equilibria under the form of Markov equilibria. In
this section, I also prove important properties of Markov equilibria in this model. In section
4, I derive a general numerical algorithm to compute Markov and competitive equilibria.
Section 5 focuses on assets in ￿xed supply with an example of only one asset to illustrate
the ideas in sections 2 and 3. In Section 6, I present the most general model with capital
accumulation, labor supply and production. Section 7 concludes with potential applications
of the framework in this paper. Lengthy proofs and constructions are in Appendixes A-D.
2 General model
In this general model, there are heterogeneous agents who di⁄er in their beliefs about the
future streams of dividends. There are also di⁄erent types of assets (for examples trees, land,
housing and machines) that di⁄er in their dividend process and their collateral value. For ex-
ample, some of the assets can be used as collateral to borrow and others cannot. These assets
are in ￿xed supplied as in Lucas (1978) in order to study the e⁄ects of belief heterogeneity on
asset prices. In Section 6, I show that the model can also allow for assets in ￿ exible supply
and production in order to study the e⁄ects of belief heterogeneity on aggregate physical
investment and aggregate economy activity. Assets in ￿xed supply presented in this section
are special cases of assets in ￿ exible supply with adjustment costs approaching in￿nity.
82.1 The endowment economy
Consider an endowment, a single consumption (￿nal) good economy in in￿nite horizon with
in￿nitely-lived agents. Time runs from t = 0 to 1. There are H types of consumers
h 2 H =f1;2;:::;Hg
in the economy with a continuum of measure 1 of identical consumers in each type. These
consumers might di⁄er in many dimensions including per period utility function Uh (c) (i.e.,
risk-aversion), discount rates ￿h, and endowments of good eh. The consumers might also
di⁄er in their initial endowment of physical assets, Lucas￿trees,10 paying o⁄real dividends in
terms of the consumption good. However, the most important dimension of heterogeneity is
the heterogeneity in beliefs over the evolution of the exogenous state of the economy. There
are S possible exogenous states (or equivalently shocks)
s 2 S = f1;2;:::;Sg:
The states capture both idiosyncratic uncertainties, i.e., individual endowments, and aggre-
gate uncertainties, i.e., the dividends from the physical assets.11
The evolution of the economy is captured by the past and current realizations of the
shocks over time: st = (s0;s1;:::;st) is the series of realizations of shocks up to time t.
Notice that the space S can be chosen large enough to encompass both aggregate shocks,
such as shocks to the aggregate dividends, and idiosyncratic shocks, such as individual
endowment shocks. I assume that the shocks follow a Markov process with the transition
probabilities ￿ (s;s0). Moreover, S is an ergodic set.
Now, in contrast to the standard rational expectation literature, I assume that the agents
do not have a perfect estimate of the transition matrix ￿. Each of them has their own estimate
of the matrix, ￿h:12 However, these estimates are not very far from the truth, .i.e., there exist





0 2 S and h 2 H
where ￿ (s;s0) = 0 if and only if ￿h (s;s0) = 0 in which case let
￿h(s;s0)
￿(s;s0) = 1:This formulation
allows for time varying belief heterogeneity as in He and Xiong (2011). In particular, agents
might share the same beliefs in good states, ￿h (s;:) = ￿h0 (s;:); but their beliefs start
diverging in bad states, ￿h (s;:) 6= ￿h0 (s;:).13
10See Lucas (1978)
11A state s can be a vector s = (A;￿1;:::;￿H) where A consists of aggregate shocks and ￿h are idiosyncratic
shocks.
12Learning can be easily incorporated into this framework as into this framework by allowing additional
state variables which are the current beliefs of agents in the economy. As in Blume and Easley (2006) and
Sandroni (2000), agents who learn slower will dissappear under complete markets. However they all survive
under incomplete markets. The dynamics of asset prices describe here will corresponds to the short-run
behavior of asset prices in the economy with learning.
13Simsek (2009b) shows in a static model that only the divergence in beliefs about bad states matters for
asset prices.
9Real Assets: As mentioned above, there are A physical assets a 2 A =f1;2;:::;Ag.
These assets pay o⁄state-dependent dividends da (s) in ￿nal good. These assets can both be
purchased and be used as collateral to borrow. This gives rise to the notion of leverage on
each asset. The ex-dividend price of each unit of asset a in history st is denoted by qa (st). I
assume that agents cannot short-sell these real assets. The supply Ka of asset a is given at
the beginning of the economy, under the form of asset endowments to consumers.
Financial Assets: In each history st, there are also (collateralized) ￿nancial assets,
j 2 J. Each ￿nancial asset j (or ￿nancial security) is characterized by a pair of vectors,
promised payo⁄s and collateral requirement (bj;kj). Promises are a standard feature of
￿nancial asset similarly to Arrow￿ s securities, i.e., asset j traded in history st promises
next-period pay-o⁄ bj (st+1) = bj (st+1) > 0 in term of ￿nal good at the successor nodes
st+1 = (st;st+1). The non-standard feature is the collateral requirement. Agents can only
sell the ￿nancial asset j if they hold shares of real assets as collateral. We associate j with
an A￿dimensional vector kj ￿ 0 of collateral requirements. If an agent sells one unit of
security j, she is required to to hold kj
a units of asset, a 2 A, as collateral. If an asset a
is required as collateral for ￿nancial security j 2 J, the agent selling this ￿nancial asset is
required to hold kj
a in asset a.14
Since there are no penalties for default, a seller of the ￿nancial asset defaults at a node
st+1 whenever the total value of collateral assets falls below the promise at that state. By
























Let pj;t (st) denote price of security j at node st:








If a ￿nancial asset j requires no collateral then its e⁄ective pay-o⁄, determined by (1)
will be zero, it will be easy to show that in equilibrium its price, pj; will be zero as well. We
can thus ignore these ￿nancial assets.
Remark 1 I will call the ￿nancial markets incomplete even if J is complete in the normal
sense of complete spanning, i.e., J ￿ S. The ￿nancial markets are endogenously incomplete
due to the fact that agents are constrained in the positions they can take due to the collateral
requirement and the fact that the total supply of collateral assets is ￿nite. The collateral
requirement is a special case of limited commitment, as if borrowers (sellers of the ￿nancial
assets) have full commitment ability, they will not be required to put up any collateral to
borrow.
14Notice that, there are only one-period ahead ￿nancial assets. See He and Xiong (2011) for a motivation
why longer term collateralized ￿nancial assets are not used in equilibrium.
10Remark 2 Consider the case in which a ￿nancial asset j requires only kj
a units of asset a
as collateral. When an agents purchase kj
a units of asset a. At the same time she can pledge
these units as collateral to borrow pj;t ,that is, selling the ￿nancial asset j at that price. So








Even though there are many ￿nancial assets available, in equilibrium only some ￿nancial
asset will be actively traded, which in turn determines which leverage levels prevail in the
economy. In this sense, both asset price and leverage are simultaneously determined in
equilibrium, as emphasized in Geanakoplos (2009).
Remark 3 It will be shown in Appendix B that the set J of ￿nancial securities can depend








For example, Jt contains a ￿nancial security j that requires only an asset a as collateral with







qa (st+1) + da (st+1)
￿
: (3)
So in this example k
j





= bj (st+1) 8st+1 2 S:
This constraint captures the situation in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in which agents can
borrow only up to the minimum across future states of the future value of their land. With
S = 2, and state non-contingent debts, i.e., bj (st+1) = bj; Geanakoplos (2009) argues that
even if we allow for a wide range of collateral level, that is the unique collateral level that
prevails in equilibrium (thus there is a unique level of leverage in each instance, according to
the remark above). This statement for two future states still holds in this context of in￿nitely-
lived agents as proved later in Section 5. However, this might not be true if we have more
than two future states.
Consumers: Consumers are the most important actors in this economy. They can be
hedge fund managers or banks￿traders in ￿nancial markets.
In each state st, each consumer is endowed with eh
t = eh (st) units of ￿nal good. I
suppose there is a strictly positive lower bound on these endowments. This lower bound
guarantees a lower bound on consumption if a consumer decides to default on all her debt
and withdraw from the ￿nancial markets.
Assumption 2 minh;s eh (s) > e > 0.
11For example, commercial banks receive deposits from their retail branches while these
banks also have trading desks that trade independently in the ￿nancial markets. In Section
6, endowments can come in the form of labor endowments.
Consumer maximize their intertemporal expected utility with the per period utility func-
tions Uh (:) : R+ ￿! R that satisfy
Assumption 3 Uh is concave and strictly increasing.
Notice that I do not require Uh to be strictly concave. This assumption captures linear
utility functions in Geanakoplos (2009) and Harrison and Kreps (1978).




















































a ￿ 0 8a 2 A (5)
One implicit condition from the assumption on utility functions is that consumptions are
positive, i.e., ch
t ￿ 0. In the constraint (5), if the consumer does not use asset a as collateral
to sell any ￿nancial security, then the constraint becomes the no-short sale constraint
k
h
a;t ￿ 0: (6)
The most important feature of the objective function is the superscript h in the expectation
operator, Eh [:] that represents subjective beliefs when agents estimate their future expected

















where Ph (st) is the probability of history st under agent h￿ s belief.
In the budget constraint (4), eh
t is her endowment that can depend on the aggregate
state st. Entering period t, the agent holds kh
a;t￿1 old units of real asset a and ￿
h
j;t￿1 units of
￿nancial asset j. She can trade old units of real asset a at price qa;t, buy new units of asset
kh
a;t for time t+1 at price qa;t. She can also buy and sell ￿nancial securities ￿
h
j;t at price pj;t.
If she sells ￿nancial securities she is subject to collateral requirement (5).
15I also introduce the disutility of labor in the general existence proof in Appendix B in order to study
employment in this environment. The existence of equilibria for ￿nite horizon allows for labor choice decision.
When we have strictly positive labor endowments, lh, we can relax Assumption 2 on ￿nal-good endowments,
eh.
12At ￿rst sight, the collateral constraint (5) does not have the usual property of ￿nancial
constraints in the sense that higher asset prices do not seem to enable more borrowing.
However, using the de￿nition of the e⁄ective pay-o⁄, fj;t; in (1), we can see that this e⁄ective
pay-o⁄is increasing in the prices of physical assets, qa;t+1. As a result, ￿nancial asset prices,
pj;t, are also increasing in physical asset prices. So borrowers can borrow more if qa;t+1￿ s
increase. Given that the borrowing constraints is e⁄ective through future asset prices, when
we embed this channel in a production economy in Section 6, this constraint creates a
feed-back mechanism from the ￿nancial sector to the real sector di⁄erent from the one in
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010).16
Even though the formulation and solution method presented below allow for heterogeneity
in the discount rates, to focus on beliefs heterogeneity, I assume in this section that agents
have the same discount factor.
Assumption 4 Agents have the same discount factor ￿h = ￿ 8h 2 H
Equilibrium: In this environment, I de￿ne an incomplete markets equilibrium as follows







and initial shock s0 is a collection of consumption, real and ￿nancial asset holdings and

































satisfying the following conditions:



























solves the individual maximization prob-
lem subject to the budget constraint, (4), and the collateral constraint, (5).
Notice that by setting the set of ￿nancial securities J empty, we obtain a model with no
￿nancial markets in which agents are only allowed to trade in real assets, but they cannot
short-sell these assets. This case corresponds to Lucas (1978)￿ s model with several trees and
heterogeneous agents.
16Thanks to Markus Brunnermeir for pointing this out.
13As a benchmark, I also study equilibria under complete ￿nancial markets. Consumers
can borrow and lend freely by buying and selling Arrow-Debreu state contingent securities,
only subject to the no-Ponzi condition.17 In each node st; there are S ￿nancial securities.
Financial security s delivers one unit of ￿nal good if state s happens at time t + 1 and zero
units otherwise. Let ps;t denote time t price and let ￿
h
s;t denote consumer h￿ s holding of this























De￿nition 2 A complete markets equilibrium is de￿ned similarly to an incomplete mar-
kets equilibrium except that each consumer solves her individual maximization problem subject
to the budget constraint (7) and the no-Ponzi condition, instead of the collateral constraint
(5).
In the next subsection, I establish some properties of incomplete markets equilibrium. I
compare each of these properties to the one of complete markets equilibrium.
2.2 General properties of incomplete and complete markets equi-
libria
Given the endowment economy, we can easily show that total supply of ￿nal good in each











The ￿rst term of the right hand side is the total endowment of each individual. The second
term is total dividends from the real assets. In incomplete or complete markets equilibria,
the market clearing condition for ￿nal good implies that total consumption is bounded from
above by e. Given that consumption of every agent is always positive, consumption of each







Under the boundedness of total quantities of assets, we can show that in any incomplete
markets equilibrium, consumption of consumers is bounded from below by a strictly positive
constant c. Two assumptions are important for this result. First, no-default-penalty allows
consumers, at any moment in time, to walk away from their past debts and only lose their
collateral assets. After defaulting, they can always keep their non-￿nancial wealth (inequality
(11) below). Second, increasingly large speculation by postponing current consumption is not
an equilibrium strategy, because in equilibrium, consumption is bounded by e (see inequality
12 below). This assumption prevents agents from constantly postponing their consumption
























; 8h 2 H; (10)
where e is de￿ned in (8).Then in a incomplete markets equilibrium, consumption of each
consumer in each history always exceeds c.
Proof. As in (9), we can ￿nd an upper bound for consumption of each consumer in each
future period. Also, in each period, one of the feasible strategies of consumer h is to default
on all her past debts at the only cost of losing all the collateral assets, but she can still at
least consume her endowment from the current period on, therefore













Notice that in equilibrium,
P















Uh (e) > Uh (c)
Two remarks can be made here. First, condition (10) is satis￿ed immediately if
lim
c￿!0Uh (c) = ￿1;
for example, with log utility or CRRA utility with CRRA constant exceeds 1. Second, the
lower bound of consumption, c; is decreasing in e. Therefore, the more there is of the total
available ￿nal good, the more pro￿table speculative activities are and the more incentives
consumers have to defer current consumption to engage in these activities.
This survival mechanism is similar to the one in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Beker
and Espino (2010), in particular the ￿rst term in the right hand side of (10) captures the
fact that the agents always have the option to default and go to autarky in which they only
consume their endowment which exceeds e in each period. However, the survival mechanism
in this paper also di⁄ers because, agents can always default on their promises and lose all
their physical asset holdings, but they can always go back to ￿nancial markets to trade right
after defaulting. The second term in the right hand side of (10) captures the fact that, the
most the agents can lose after each trading period after coming back to the ￿nancial markets
is e. The agents are also likely to make losses after coming back if they hold incorrect beliefs.
One immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is that every consumer survives in equilibrium.
Therefore, incomplete markets equilibrium di⁄ers from complete markets equilibrium when
consumers di⁄er in their beliefs. The proposition below shows that in a complete markets
15equilibrium, with strict di⁄erence in beliefs, consumption of certain consumers will come
arbitrarily close to 0 at some history. The intuition for this result is that if an agent believes
that the likelihood of a state is much smaller than what other agents believe, the agent will
want to exchange his consumption in that state for consumption in other states. Complete
markets allow her to do so but, in incomplete markets equilibrium, the collateral constraint
limits the amount of consumption that she can sell in each state.
Proposition 1 Suppose there are consumers with the correct belief and some consumers









t = 0 (14)
for each h such that ￿h di⁄ers from ￿, that is h has incorrect belief.








































Iterating backward for r = t ￿ 2;:::;0 and multiplying side by side the same equation for


























































From inequality (9), we have U0


































or equivalently, given the Inada condition (13), we obtain (14).
16Corollary 1 In a competitive equilibrium with complete markets, under the Inada condition
(13), if agents strictly di⁄er in their beliefs, then consumption of some agent approaches zero







Proof. If agents strictly di⁄er in their beliefs, there exists a pair of agents h;h0 such that














Notice that this result is rather surprising because even if agents are strictly risk-averse,
they can also disappear over time if they have incorrect beliefs.18 Because they can perfectly
commit to pay their creditor using their future income. They can do so using short-term
debts and keep rolling over their debts while using their present income to pay interests,
which grows over time as their indebtedness grows. This result also sheds light on the
survival mechanism in Theorem 1: agents have limited ability to pledge their future income,
for example their labor income, to their creditors. As a result, they can always default and
keep their future income. This limited commitment is even stronger in my setting than in
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Beker and Espino (2010)19 because after defaulting, agents
can always come back and trade in the ￿nancial markets by buying new physical assets and
then use these physical assets to sell ￿nancial assets.2021This story is also di⁄erent from the
limited arbitrage story in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), where asset prices di⁄er from their
fundamental values because agents with correct beliefs hit their ￿nancial constraints before
18If the consumers with incorrect beliefs are risk-neutral, their consumption will go to zero immediately
after a certain date.
19Following the language of Kehoe and Levine (2001), agents are debt-constrained in these two papers,
while they are liquidity-constrained in my paper.
20In Chien and Lustig (2009), in equilibrium, borrowers are indi⁄erent between defaulting and not default-
ing due to the complete spanning properties of ￿nancial assets. In my model, when there is not complete
spanning, there will be strict defaults in equilibrium. The numerical method in Section 4 can be used to
solve for equilibria in Chien and Lustig (2009) as well. See Hopenhayn and Werning (2008) for a model in
which equilibrium defaults happen due to stochastic outside options.
21The following story of the founder of Long Term Capital Management shows that traders in the ￿nancial
markets often have limited commitment: John Meriwether worked as a bond trader at Salomon Brothers.
At Salomon, Meriwether rose to become the head of the domestic ￿xed income arbitrage group in the early
1980s and vice-chairman of the company in 1988. In 1991, after Salomon was caught in a Treasury securities
trading scandal, Meriwether decided to leave the company. Meriwether founded the Long-Term Capital
Management hedge fund in Greenwich, Connecticut in 1994. Long-Term Capital Management spectacularly
collapsed in 1998. A year after LTCM￿ s collapse, in 1999, Meriwether founded JWM Partners LLC. The
Greenwich, Connecticut hedge fund opened with $250 million under management in 1999 and by 2007
had approximately $3 billion. The Financial crisis of 2007-2009 badly battered Meriwether￿ s ￿rm. From
September 2007 to February 2009, his main fund lost 44 percent. On July 8, 2009, Meriwether closed the
fund.
17being able to arbitrage away the price di⁄erence. Here, agents with incorrect beliefs hit
their ￿nancial constraint more often and are protected by the constraint. Moreover, in the
equilibria computed in Section 5.2, agents with the correct belief (the pessimists) never hit
their borrowing constraint.
Due to di⁄erent conclusions about agents￿survival, the following corollary asserts that
complete and incomplete markets allocations strictly di⁄er when some agents strictly di⁄er
in their beliefs.
Corollary 2 Suppose that conditions in Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 are satis￿ed. Then,
an incomplete markets equilibrium never yields an allocation that can be supported by a com-
plete markets equilibrium. By the Second Welfare Theorem, incomplete markets equilibrium
allocations are Pareto-ine¢ cient.
Proof. In a incomplete markets equilibrium, consumptions are bounded away from 0, but
in a complete markets equilibrium, consumptions of some agents will approach 0. Therefore,
the two sets of allocations never intersect.
Using this corollary, we can formalize and show the shortages of collateral assets.
Proposition 2 (Collateral Shortages) If ￿nancial markets are complete in terms of span-
ning, i.e., the set of the vectors of promises bj has full rank. Then, for any given time t,
with positive probability, the collateral constraints must be binding for some agent after time
t.2223
Proof. We prove this corollary by contradiction. Suppose none of the collateral constraints
are binding after a certain date. Then we can take the ￿rst-order condition with respect
to the state-contingent securities. This leads to consumption of some agents to approach
zero at in￿nity, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1. This contradicts the conclusion of
Theorem 1 that consumption of each agent is bounded away from zero.
Notice that, as in Lucas (1978), agents can hold the physical assets for the risk-return and
consumption-investment trade-o⁄s. However, when their collateral constraints are binding,
the agents use these assets solely as collateral to borrow. Consequently, I interpret the
binding collateral constraints as collateral shortages. Araujo, Kubler, and Schommer (2009)
argue that when there is enough collateral we might reach the Pareto optimal allocation.
However, in the complete markets case, there will never be enough collateral.24
I also emphasize here the di⁄erence between belief heterogeneity and other forms of
heterogeneity such as heterogeneity in endowments or in risk-aversion. The following propo-
sition, in the same form as Theorem 5 in Geanakoplos and Zame (2007), shows that if
consumers share the same belief and discount rate, there exist endowment pro￿les with
which collateral equilibria attain the ￿rst-best allocations.
22It can also be shown that, at any moment of time, for every agent, the collateral constraint must be
binding some time in future with positive probability.
23I also use the techniques developed in Beker and Chattopadhyay (2010) to show this result when J is
non-empty but not complete.
24I show in Appendix B that even if the supply of these collateral assets is endogeneous, there will still be
collateral shortages.
18Proposition 3 If consumers share the same belief and discount factor, there is an open set
of endowment pro￿les with the properties that the competitive equilibrium can be supported
by an incomplete markets equilibrium.
Proof. We start with an allocation such that there is no trade in the complete markets equi-
librium, then as we move to a neighborhood of that allocation, all trade can be collateralized.
Even though other dimensions of heterogeneity such as risk-aversion and endowments
also create trading in ￿nancial markets, this proposition shows the importance of belief
heterogeneity in driving up trading volume and resulting in binding collateral constraints.
Before moving to show the existence and study the properties of incomplete markets
equilibria, we go back to the complete markets benchmark to study the behavior of asset
price volatility. We will compare this volatility with volatility under incomplete markets and
show that, in general, in the long run, asset price is more volatile in an incomplete markets
equilibrium than it is in a complete markets equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Suppose that there are some agents with the correct belief, in the complete
markets equilibrium, asset prices are asymptotically independent of the past realizations of
the aggregate shocks in the long run. Formally, there exists a set of asset prices qa (s) as








￿ ￿ = 0:
Proof. The detailed proof is in Appendix A. Sandroni (2000) shows that in the long run,
only agents with the correct belief survive. Therefore, in the long run, the economy converges
to the economy with homogeneous belief (rational expectation). In such an economy, given
markets completeness, there exists a representative agent with an instantaneous utility






























in which e(s) is the aggregate endowment in the aggregate state s. We can see easily from
this expression that qa (st) is history-independent.
As the simulation of complete markets equilibrium in Section 5 shows, asset prices always
depend on the wealth distribution of assets among agents, even so in the long run limit.
However, as agents with incorrect beliefs vanish, the wealth distribution among agents with
correct beliefs also converges to a constant distribution. So asset prices will depend only on
the exogenous state of the economy.
Corollary 3 When shocks are I.I.D. and the aggregate endowment is constant across states,
with probability one, asset prices converge to constants in the long run.
19Proof. By assumption e(st+r) = e for all t and r. So U0
Rep (e) cancels out in both sides of


















The second equality comes from the fact that shocks are I.I.D.
In contrast to complete markets equilibrium, in the next section I show that, in incomplete
markets equilibrium, asset prices can be history-dependent, as past realizations of aggregate
shocks a⁄ect the wealth distribution, which in turn a⁄ects asset prices.
One issue that might arise when one tries to interpret Proposition 4 is that, in some
economy, there might not be any consumer whose belief coincides with the truth. For
example, in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), all agents can be wrong all the time, except they
constantly switch from over-optimistic to over-pessimistic.25 To avoid this issue, I again use
the language in Blume and Easley (2006) and Sandroni (2000). I reformulate the results
above using the subjective belief of each consumer.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the Inada condition (13) is satis￿ed. Then each agent believes
that:
1) In complete markets equilibrium, only her and consumers sharing her belief survive in the
long run. However, in incomplete markets equilibrium, everyone survives in the long run.
2) In complete markets equilibrium, asset prices are history-independent. However, in in-
complete markets equilibrium, asset price can be history-dependent.
The properties in this section are established under the presumption that incomplete
markets equilibria exist. The next section is devoted to show the existence of these equilibria
with a stationary structure. The next two sections follow closely the organization in Kubler
and Schmedders (2003). The ￿rst shows the existence and the second presents an algorithm
to compute the equilibria.
3 Markov Equilibrium
3.1 The state space











a (qa;t + da;t)Ka
:
25Sandroni (2000) shows that if none of the agents has the correct beliefs, then only agents with beliefs
closest to the truth survive, where distance is measured using entropy.
26Sometime I refer to this normalized ￿nancial wealth as simply ￿nancial wealth.




denote the normalized ￿nancial wealth distribution. Then in
equilibrium ! (st) always lies in the (H-1)-dimensional simplex ￿, i.e., !h ￿ 0 and
PH
h=1 !h =
1. !h￿ s are positive because of the collateral constraint (5) that requires the value of each
agent￿ s asset holdings to exceed the liabilities from their past ￿nancial assets holdings. And
the sum of !h equals 1 because of the asset market clearing and ￿nancial market clearing
conditions.
I will show that, under conditions detailed in Subsection 3.3 below, there exists a Markov
equilibrium over a compact state space. I look for an equilibrium in which equilibrium prices
and allocations depend only on the states (st;!t) 2 S ￿ ￿.
Let the state space X consist of all exogenous and endogenous variables that occur in
the economy at some node ￿, i.e., X = S ￿V, where S is the ￿nite set of exogenous shocks
and V is the set of all possible endogenous variables.
In each node ￿, an element v (￿) 2 V includes: the normalized wealth distribution
(!h (￿))h2H 2 ￿, together with consumers￿decisions: consumption, H current consumption ￿
ch (￿)
￿







h2H : It also includes
A1 prices of assets with ￿xed supply (qa (￿))a2A1. Finally it includes J prices of the ￿nancial
assets (pj (￿))j2J. Therefore V =￿ ￿ E ￿ b V with










the set of endogenous variables other than the wealth distribution.
Finally, let X ￿ V denote the set of vectors of all the endogenous variables that satisfy:











a = Ka 8a;




h (q + d) ￿ K ￿ q ￿ k
h ￿ p ￿ ￿
h. (18)












3.2 Markov Equilibrium De￿nition
In order to de￿ne a Markov equilibrium, I use the following de￿nition of expectation corre-
spondence. Given a state (s;v) 2 X, the ￿ expectation correspondence￿
27We use the vector product a ￿ b =
P
i aibi
21g : X ￿ V
S
describes all next period states that are consistent with market clearing and agents￿￿rst-












s ) 2 X for each s 2 S if for all households h 2 H the following conditions holds















a (q+ + d+)
￿
P
a (q+ + d+) ￿ K
:
b) There exist multipliers ￿h




































































, there exist multipliers ￿h
j (+)
and ￿h


























































De￿nition 3 A Markov equilibrium consists of a (non-empty valued) "policy correspon-
dence," P, and a transition function F
P : S ￿ ￿ ￿ E￿b V
and
F : graph(P) ￿! V
S
such that graph(P) ￿ X and for all x 2 graph(P) and all s 2 S we have F (x) ￿ g (x) and
(s;Fs (x)) 2 graph(P).
Lemma 1 A Markov equilibrium is an incomplete markets equilibrium according to De￿ni-
tion 1.
22Proof. This result is similar to the one in Du¢ e, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan
(1994). We only need to show that the ￿rst order conditions as represented by Lagrange
multipliers are su¢ cient to ensure the optimal solution of the consumers. This holds because
the optimization each consumer faces is a convex maximization problem.
Before continue, let me brie￿ y discuss asset prices in a Markov equilibrium.






























































We have a strict inequality if there is a strict inequality ￿h
a;t+r > 0 in the future. So the asset
price is higher than the discounted value of the stream of its dividend because in future it
can be sold to other agents, as in Harrison and Kreps (1978) or it can be used as collateral
to borrow as in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008). Proposition 2 shows some conditions under
which collateral constraints will eventually be binding for every agent when they strictly
di⁄er in their belief. As a results, asset price is strictly higher than the discounted value of
dividends.28
Equation (19) also shows that asset a will have collateral value when some ￿h
a > 0,
in addition to the asset￿ s traditional pay-o⁄ value weighted at the appropriate discount
factors. Unlike in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), attempts to ￿nd a pricing kernel which prices
assets using their pay-o⁄ value might prove fruitless because assets with the same payo⁄s
but di⁄erent collateral values will have di⁄erent prices. This point is also emphasized in
Geanakoplos￿ s￿papers.






















As in Garleanu and Pedersen (2010), the price of ￿nancial asset j does not only depend on


















3.3 Existence and Properties of Markov equilibrium
The existence proof is similar to the ones in Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Magill and
Quinzii (1994).
We approximate the Markov equilibrium by a sequence of equilibria in ￿nite horizon.
There are three steps in the proof. First, using Kakutani ￿xed point theorem to prove
28We can also derive a formula for the equity premium that depends on the multilipliers ￿ similar to the
equity premium formula in Mendoza (2010)
23the existence proof of the truncated T-period economy. Second, show that all endogenous
variables are bounded. And lastly, show that the limit as T goes to in￿nity is the equilibrium
of the in￿nite horizon economy.
However, the most di¢ cult part, including in the two related papers, is to prove the
second step and this step involves the most of problem-speci￿c economics intuitions. Basi-
cally showing that quantities are bounded is easy (especially with collateral constraint), but
showing prices are bounded is more challenging. For example, what are the upper bounds of
prices of long-lived assets? These prices may well exceed the current aggregate endowment.
With physical investment in Section 6, we also have to bound the total supply of elastic-
supply capital. I get around this di¢ culty by using the usual assumption in the neoclassical
growth model: assuming capital depreciates and strictly concave production functions, then
combining it with the arti￿cial compact boxes trick in Debreu (1959).
Lemma 2 Consider a ￿nite horizon economy that last T +1 periods t = 0;1;:::;T, identical
















and in the last period t = T, there are no ￿nancial markets. In the ￿rst period, the budget














(qa;0 + da;0)Ka (21a)
instead of (4):An equilibrium exists given any initial condition
(s0 2 S;!0 2 ￿):
Instead of the usual budget constraints used in recursive equilibria, we use the condition
that each consumer holds a share of the ￿nal total value of assets. This sharing rule can be
implemented by assuming each agent h holds exactly !h
0 share of each asset a 2 A.
Proof. The proof follows the steps in Debreu (1959) using Kakutani￿ s ￿xed point theorem
and is presented in the Appendix. However it uses a di⁄erent de￿nition of attainable sets.
Indeed, in De￿nition 7 in the Appendix, negative excess demand (instead of zero excess
demand as in the original text) is enough to guarantee the boundedness of the equilibrium
allocations. In addition, I will also show that prices are strictly positive.
To prove that the Markov equilibrium exists, we need to ￿rst show that there exists a
compact set in which ￿nite horizon equilibria lie. We need the following assumption
Assumption 5 There exist c;c > 0 such that
















8h 2 H: (22)
24and












8h 2 H: (23)
The intuition for (22) is detailed in the proof of Theorem 1; it ensures a lower bound
for consumption. (23) ensures that prices of real assets are bounded from above. Both
inequalities are obviously satis￿ed by log utility.
Lemma 3 Suppose 5 is satis￿ed then there is a compact set that contains the equilibrium
endogenous variables constructed in Lemma 2 for every T and every initial condition lying
inside the set.
Proof. Appendix.
Theorem 2 Under the same conditions, a Markov equilibrium exists.
Proof. In Appendix B, I show the existence of Markov equilibria for a general model with
capital accumulation as well. As in Kubler and Schmedders (2003), we extract a limit from
the T-￿nite horizon equilibria. Lemma 3 guarantees that equilibrium prices and quantities
are bounded as T goes to in￿nity. The proof use an alternative de￿nition of attainable sets
and also corrects several errors in the Appendix of Kubler and Schmedders (2003).
Corollary 4 In a Markov equilibrium, every consumer survives.
Proof. From the construction of the equilibrium ch (st) > c for all h;t;st:
Corollary 5 The Markov equilibrium is Pareto-ine¢ cient if agents strictly di⁄er in their
beliefs.
Proof. In Proposition 1, I show that under complete market, i.e. Pareto e¢ cient allocation,
consumption of some agents get arbitrarily close to zero in some history. Given the lower
bound on consumption of each Markov equilibrium, an allocation corresponding to a Markov
equilibrium is not a complete markets allocation. Therefore it is not a Pareto e¢ cient
allocation.
Proposition 6 In contrast to the complete markets benchmark, in these Markov equilibria,
asset prices can be history-dependent.
Proof. The realization of aggregate shocks determines the evolution of the ￿nancial wealth
distribution which is one factor that determines asset prices.
Proposition 7 When the aggregate endowment is constant across states s 2 S, and shocks
are I.I.D., long run asset price volatility is higher under incomplete markets than it is under
complete markets.
25Proof. Corollary 4 show that, in the long run, under complete markets and the assumptions
above, the economy converges to the one with homogenous beliefs because agents with
incorrect beliefs will eventually be driven out of the markets and asset price qa (st) converges
to prices independent of time and state. Hence, under complete markets, asset price volatility
converges to zero in the long run. Under incomplete markets, asset price volatility remains
well above zero as aggregate shocks constantly change the wealth distribution, which, in
turn, changes asset prices and investment.
There are two components of asset price volatility. The ￿rst one comes from the volatility
in the dividend process and aggregate endowment. The second one comes from wealth
distribution, when agents strictly di⁄er in their beliefs. However, the second component
disappears under complete markets because only agents with correct beliefs survive in the
long run. Whereas, under incomplete markets, this component persists. As a result, when
we shut down the ￿rst component, asset price is more volatile under incomplete markets than
it is under complete markets in the long run. In general, the same comparison holds or not
depending on the long-run correlation between the ￿rst and the second volatility components
under incomplete markets.
4 Numerical Method
In this section, I present an algorithm to compute Markov equilibria de￿ned in the last
section. This algorithm can also be used to compute complete markets equilibria and is
presented in Appendix C.
4.1 General Algorithm
Suppose we need to ￿nd a function ￿ de￿ned over S ￿ E on to a compact set A ￿ RN,
where S has a ￿nite number of elements and E is convex and compact, and ￿ satis￿es the
functional equation
￿ = f + T￿
We then ￿rst discretize E by fe1;e2;:::;eKg, and ￿n = (￿n
1;￿n
2;:::;￿n
S), each component is
de￿ned over fe1;e2;:::;eKg. Let e ￿
n
s be the extrapolation of ￿n
s over E. Then
￿
n+1
s (ek) = argmin
r2A
kr ￿ ff (ek) + Te ￿
n
s (ek)gk (24)
If we have a ￿xed point ￿n+1 = ￿n and f (ek) + Te ￿
n
s (ek) 2 A then
￿
n
s (ek) = f (ek) + Te ￿
n
s (ek)
We present an implementation of this general algorithm to compute Markov Equilibria.
We can also use the algorithm to compute competitive equilibria with complete markets.
The state space in this case is the current consumption of each agent and the total supply
of assets with elastic supply. The details are presented in the Appendix.
264.2 Algorithm to Compute Markov Equilibria
The construction of Markov equilibria in the last section also suggests an algorithm to
compute them. The following algorithm is based on Kubler and Schmedders (2003). There
is one important di⁄erence between the algorithm here and the original algorithm. The
more important di⁄erence is that the future wealth distributions are included in the current
mapping instead of solving for them using sub-￿xed-point loops. This innovation reduces
signi￿cantly the computing time, given that solving for a ￿xed-point is time consuming in
MATLAB. Relatedly, in section 5, as we seek to ￿nd the set of actively traded ￿nancial
assets, we can include the future asset price as one of the components of the function ￿:
We look for the following correspondence









b v 2 b V is the set of endogenous variables excluding the wealth distribution and total capital,
as de￿ned in (17). (!+
s )s2S are the wealth distributions in the S future states and ￿;￿ are
Lagrange multipliers as de￿ned in subsection 3.2.
From a given continuous initial mapping ￿0 = (￿0
1;￿0
2;:::;￿0
S), we construct the sequence





n=0 by induction. Suppose we have obtained ￿n, for each










that solves the forward equations presented in the Appendix.
We construct the sequence f￿ng
1
n=0 on a ￿nite discretization of S ￿ ￿ ￿ E. So from ￿n
to ￿n+1, we will have to extrapolate the values of ￿n to outside the grid using extrapolation
methods in MATLAB. Fixing a precision ￿, the algorithm stops when k￿n+1 ￿ ￿nk < ￿.
There are two important details in implementing this algorithm:
First, in order to calculate the (n + 1)-th mapping ￿n+1 from the n￿th mapping, we need
to only keep track of the consumption decisions ch and asset prices qa and pj. Even though
other asset holding decisions and Lagrange multipliers might not be di⁄erentiable functions
of the normalized ￿nancial wealth distribution, the consumption decisions and asset prices
normally are.29Relatedly, when there are redundant assets, there might be multiple asset
holdings that implement the same consumption policies and asset prices.30
Second, if we choose the initial mapping ￿0 as an equilibrium of the 1￿period economy
as in Subsection 3.3, then ￿n corresponds to an equilibrium of the (n + 1)￿period economy.
I follow this choice in computing an equilibrium of the 2-agent economy presented below.
5 Asset price volatility and leverage
This section uses the algorithm just described to compute incomplete and complete markets
equilibria and study asset price and leverage. In order to focus on asset price, I only keep
29See Brumm and Grill (2010) for an algorithm with adapted grid points that deals directly with non-
di⁄erentiabilities in the policy functions.
30See Cao, Chen, and Scott (2011) for such an example.
27one real asset in ￿xed supply. Each ￿nancial asset corresponds to a leverage level. Suppose
selling ￿nancial asset j requires kj units of the ￿xed-supply asset as collateral and price of
j is pj. This operation is equivalent to buy kj units of the real asset, at price q with pj
borrowed. Therefore, leverage as de￿ned in Geanakoplos (2009), and in Remark 3 by the










If in equilibrium, only one ￿nancial asset j is traded, the leverage level corresponding to the
￿nancial asset is called the leverage level of the economy.
To make the analysis as well as the numerical procedure simple, I allow for only one
asset and two types of agents: optimists and pessimists, each in measure 1 of identical
agents. The general framework in Section 2 allows for a wide range of ￿nancial assets with
di⁄erent promises and collateral requirements. However, given that the total quantity of
collateral is exogenously bounded, in equilibrium, only certain ￿nancial assets are actively
traded. I choose a speci￿c setting based on Geanakoplos (2009), in which I can ￿nd exactly
which assets are traded. The setting requires that promises are state-incontingent and in
each exogenous state there are only two possible future exogenous states. The assets that
are traded are the assets that allow maximum borrowing while keeping the payo⁄to lenders
riskless. Endogenous ￿nancial assets interestingly generate the most volatility in the ￿nancial
wealth distribution as agents borrow to the maximum and lose most of their ￿nancial wealth
as they lose their bets but their wealth increases largely when they win. This volatility in
the wealth distribution in turn feeds into asset price volatility.
An endogenous set of traded assets also implies endogenous leverage which has been the
object of interest during the current ￿nancial crisis. In order to match the observed pattern
of leverage, i.e., high in good states and low in bad states, I introduce the possibility for
changing types of uncertainty from one aggregate state to others. This feature is introduced
in Subsection 5.2.5.
To answer questions related to collateral requirements asked in the introduction, in Sub-
section 5.2.6, I allow regulators to control the sets of ￿nancial assets that can be traded.
Given the restricted set, the endogenous active assets can still be determined. One special
case is the extreme regulation that shuts down ￿nancial markets. There are surprising conse-
quences of these regulations on the welfare of agents, on the equilibrium wealth distribution
and on asset prices.
5.1 The model
There are two aggregate states s = G or B and one single asset of which the dividend
depends on the state s
d(G) > d(B):
The state follows an I.I.D. process, with the probability of high dividends, ￿, unknown to
agents in this economy. The supply of the asset is exogenous and normalized to 1. Let q (st)
denote the ex-dividend price of the asset at each history st = (s0;s1;:::;st).
28Financial Markets: At each history st, we consider the set of J of ￿nancial assets
which promise state-independent payo⁄s next period. I normalize these promises to bj = 1.

















Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) and Geanakoplos (2009) argue that if we allow for the set
J to be dense enough then in equilibrium the only ￿nancial asset traded in equilibrium is









q (st+1) + d(st+1)
￿
:
This statement also applies for my general set up under the condition that in each history
node, there are only two future aggregate states. The following proposition makes it clear.
Proposition 8 Suppose in each history st, there are only two possible future aggregate states
st+1. Given the set J; in any incomplete markets equilibrium, there is no more than one
actively traded asset with collateral requirement less than or equal to k￿ (st). There is also
no more than one actively traded asset with collateral requirement greater than or equal to
k￿ (st).
Proof. The proof of the ￿rst part requires an analysis of portfolio choice of the sellers of
these securities and is detailed in Appendix D. For the second part, notice that all securities
with collateral greater than or equal to k￿ (st) is riskless to the buyers, i.e. delivering 1 unit
of ￿nal good regardless of the future states. Hence, these securities are sold at the same
price. In addition, the sellers of the securities prefer selling securities with the least level
collateral requirement to save their collateral. Therefore in equilibrium, only one security,
with the collateral requirement the smallest above k￿ (st); is traded.
Imagine that the set J includes all collateral requirements kj 2 R+;kj > 0.31. Proposition
8 says that only securities with collateral requirement exactly equals to k￿ (st) are traded in
equilibrium. Therefore the only actively traded ￿nancial asset is riskless to its buyers. Let









Consumers: There are two types of agents in this economy, optimists, O, and pessimists,





and endowment e in each period. But they di⁄er in their belief about the transition matrix of
the aggregate state s: Suppose agent h 2 fO;Pg estimates the probability of high dividends
31To apply the existence theorem 2 I need J to be ￿nite. But we can think of J as a ￿ne enough grid.
29as ￿h
G = 1 ￿ ￿h
B:We suppose ￿O
G > ￿P
G, i.e. optimists always think that good states are more
likely than the pessimists think they are.
So each agent maximizes the inter-temporal utility (27) given their belief of the evolution
of the aggregate state, and is subject to the budget constraint
ct + qt￿t + pt￿t ￿ et + (qt + dt)￿t￿1 + ft￿t￿1; (28)
no short-sale constraint
￿t ￿ 0; (29)
and collateral constraint
￿t + ￿tk
￿ ￿ 0; (30)
for each h 2 fO;Pg. At time t, each agent choose to buy ￿t units of real asset at price qt
and ￿t units of ￿nancial asset at price pt. Moreover, Proposition 8 allows us to focus on only
one level of collateral requirement k￿.





t (st): In equilibrium











for each history st:











Due to the collateral constraint, in equilibrium, !h














t 2 [0;1] and st 2 fG;Bg
￿
is compact. I look for Markov equilibria in which prices and allocations depend solely on
that state. In Section 2, I show the existence of such a Markov equilibrium, and in Section
4, I develop an algorithm that computes such an equilibrium.
Again in a Markov equilibrium, there are two main factors that a⁄ect asset prices. The
￿rst factor is the (exogenous) aggregate state, st. The aggregate state a⁄ects prices through
the endowments of agents. Because their endowments determine their consumption, and
thus determine the marginal utility at which they evaluate the value of the asset. Aggregate
states also a⁄ect asset prices through the evolution of future aggregate states, if these states
are persistent. The second factor that I emphasize here is the (endogenous) ￿nancial wealth
distribution, !O
t , as it a⁄ects the budget constraints of di⁄erent agents, as shown in Figure 1
below. The ￿nancial wealth distribution may vary signi￿cantly, especially when some agents
have limited non-￿nancial wealth. The evolution of the ￿nancial wealth distribution, Figure
2 below, together with the evolution of the exogenous state of the economy, determines the





d(G) = 1 > d(B) = 0:2
U (c) = log(c);
and the beliefs are ￿O = 0:9 > ￿P = 0:5. I will vary the endowments of the optimists and the
pessimists, eO and eP respectively, in di⁄erent numerical exercises. As the numerical exercise
serves for illustration purposes, I choose a low discount factor to speed up the convergence
of the numerical procedure (less than 5 minutes for converge under ￿ = 0:5).32To study the
issue of survival and its e⁄ect on asset prices, I assume that the pessimists have the correct
beliefs, i.e., ￿ = ￿P = 0:5. Thus the optimists are over-optimistics.
5.2.1 Asset Prices
Given that the main demand for the asset comes from the optimists, when their endowment
is small, their demand is more elastic with respect to "normalized ￿nancial wealth". To













I keep the aggregate endowment constant by choosing the pessimists￿endowment to be state
dependent.
Incomplete Markets Equilibrium: I rewrite the budget constraint of the optimists (28)
using normalized ￿nancial wealth, !O
t ;
ct + qt￿t + pt￿t ￿ e
O + (qt + dt)!
O:
Therefore, their total wealth eO + (qt + dt)!O a⁄ects their demand for the asset. If non-
￿nancial endowment eO of the optimists is small relative to price of the asset, their demand
for the asset is more elastic with respect to their ￿nancial wealth (qt + dt)!O. I compute
Markov equilibria for two values of the optimists￿wealth e = 1 and 10: Figure 1 plots price
of the asset as a function of the optimists￿normalized ￿nancial wealth !O for the good state
st = G. The ￿gure for the bad state st = B is similar.
The dashed line corresponds to the high "non-￿nancial" wealth of the optimists: eO = 10;
the solid line corresponds to the low "non-￿nancial" wealth of the optimists: eO = 1. The
￿gure shows that the elasticity of price with respect to !O increases as we reduce the non-
￿nancial wealth of the optimists from eO = 10 to eO = 1. This is the case because when eO
32The MATLAB code for the paper works for higher discount factors. However, the convergence time is
signi￿cantly higher for realistic values of ￿ (for ￿ = 0:95 it takes around 7 hours to converge). In Cao, Chen,
and Scott (2011), we use the code to do a more careful calibration exercise.
31is su¢ ciently high, the optimists can satisfy most of their demand for the asset using their
endowment instead of their ￿nancial wealth. Interest rate r is also endogenously determined
in these economies, however most of the time it hovers around the common discount factors
of the two agents, i.e. r(st) ￿ 1
￿ ￿ 1:























Figure 1: Asset Price Under Incomplete Markets
In order to study the dynamics of asset price, we need to combine the fact that asset
price as a function of the normalized ￿nancial wealth shown in Figure 1 with the evolution
of the exogenous state and the evolution of the "normalized ￿nancial wealth" distribution,
!O
t . Figure 2 shows the evolution of !O
t when the non-￿nancial endowment of the optimists
is relatively small with respect to the price of the asset: eO = 1. The left panel corresponds
to the current good state st = G, and the right panel corresponds to the current bad
state st = B: The solid lines represent next period normalized wealth of the optimists as a
function of the current normalized wealth, if good shock realizes next period. The dashed
lines represent the same function when the bad shock realize next period. I also plot the 45
degree lines for comparison. This ￿gure shows that, in general, good shocks tend to increase
and bad shocks tend to decrease the normalized wealth of the optimists. This is because the
optimists bet more for the good state to happen (buy borrowing collateralized and investing
into the real asset).
We can also think of normalized wealth as the fraction of the trees that the optimists
hold. When the current state is good, and the fraction is high, the optimists will get a lot
of dividends from their tree holdings, due to consumption smoothing they will not consume
all the dividends, but will use some part of the dividends to buy new trees, so we see that
on the left panel, the tree holding of the optimists normally increases at high !O. Similarly
when the current state is bad, and the fraction is high, the optimists will sell o⁄ some of
their tree holdings to smooth consumption. As a result, we see on the right panel that the
tree holding of the optimists normally decreases at high !O.
When !O is close to zero, the optimists are highly leveraged to buy the asset. If a bad
shocks hits in the next period, they have to sell o⁄ their asset holdings to pay o⁄ their
debts. Their next period ￿nancial wealth plummets and contributes to the fall in asset
32price. Consequently, we can see in Figure 1, in the blue line, which corresponds to eO = 1,
the slope of the price function is steeper for !O < 0:4: This also corresponds to the region
in which the borrowing constraint binds. Then when a bad shock hits the economy, that is
st+1 = B, the optimists are forced to liquidate their physical asset holdings. This ￿re sale of
the physical asset reduces the price of capital and tighten the constraints further and setting
the vicious circle of falling asset price. Notice that, this channel also explains a faller slope
at the lowest level of ￿nancial wealth of the optimists as they hold less of the physical asset,
the asset ￿resale has less bite. This dynamics of asset price under borrowing constraint
corresponds to the "debt-de￿ation" channel in a small-open economy in Mendoza (2010).
This example show that the channel still operates when we are in a closed-economy with














































































Figure 2: Dynamics of Wealth Distribution under Incomplete Markets
Complete Markets Equilibrium: In a complete markets equilibrium, as shown in Appendix
C, Remark 4, the state variable is the consumption of the optimists. However, there is a
one-to-one mapping from this state variable to a more meaningful state variable which is the
relative wealth of the optimists. Given that markets are complete, wealth of each consumer

















where pt (st+r) denotes the time t Arrow-Debreu price for a claim to a unit of consumption







t + V P
t
denote the relative wealth of the optimists with respect to the total wealth. Similar to the
incomplete markets equilibrium, this variable determines asset price and constantly changes
33as aggregate shocks hit the economy. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between asset price
and relative wealth33:















This ￿gure is the counterpart of Figure 1 for complete markets.34






















Figure 3: Asset Price under Complete Markets
Notice that at two extreme b !
O
t = 0 (on the left of Figure 3) or 1 (on the right of Figure 3),
we go back to the representative agent economy in which there are either only the optimists
or the pessimists.35
In this special case where the aggregate endowments are constant across states and shocks
are I.I.D., applying Corollary 3, we have in the long run, with probability 1, the price of the




(P (G)d(G) + P (B)d(B)); (32)
33The derivation of this formula is too long to include in the paper and is available upon request.
34Unlike under incomple markets, under complete markets the asset price function does not depend on
the exogenous state st due to the I.I.D assumption and constant aggregate endowment.
35When b !
O











which is smaller than when b !
O












34i.e., asset price volatility decreases to zero in the long run. Another way to see this conver-
gence, is to notice that the wealth distribution (b !O; b !P) converges to (0;1); thus according
to (31), qt converges to q (0) given by (32).
In the short-run, however, the wealth distribution constantly changes as shocks hit the
economy. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the relative wealth distribution that determines
the evolution of asset price under complete markets. This ￿gure is the counterpart of Figure
2 under complete markets. Given that the aggregate endowment is constant, the transition of
the wealth distribution does not depend on current aggregate state, unlike under incomplete
markets. The optimists buy more Arrow-Debreu assets that deliver in the good future states
and buy less Arrow-Debreu assets that deliver in bad future states. Therefore, when a good
shock hits, the relative wealth of the optimists increases (solid line) and vice versa when a
bad shock hits (dashed line). Notice that, as opposed to the Figure 2, b !O = 0 and b !O = 1
are two absorbing states. So the optimists disappear under complete markets but not under
incomplete markets.















































Figure 4: Dynamics of Wealth Distribution under Complete Markets
5.2.2 Survival under incomplete markets
Figure 5 shows a realization of the ￿nancial wealth of the optimist starting at !O = 0:5: The
optimists always lever up to buy the real asset and often they will lose all their asset holdings
(selling o⁄ their asset holdings to pay o⁄ their debt), in which case, their ￿nancial wealth
revert to zero. However, they can always use their non-￿nancial endowment to come back to
the ￿nancial markets and invest in the real asset again (leveraged). Sometime they are lucky,
that is, when the asset pays high dividends and its price appreciates, their ￿nancial wealth
can increase rapidly. Given this dynamics, there exists a non-degenerate stationary ￿nancial
wealth distribution of the optimists, shown in Figure 6. The spikes of the distribution
(including the one at 0) shows that the ￿nancial wealth of the optimists often reverts to 0
and after that the optimists come back to the ￿nancial markets with certain levels of ￿nancial
wealth. This is in contrast with the results from the same simulation exercise for complete
35markets, where with probability 1 the wealth of the optimists will go to zero in the long run,
thus the stationary distribution of the wealth of the optimists will be a degenerate mass at
0.















Wealth Dynamics under Incomplete Markets
Figure 5: A Sample Path of Wealth Distribution
















Stationary Normalized Financial Wealth Distribution
Figure 6: Stationary Normalized Wealth Distribution
5.2.3 Asset Price Volatility
We compare asset prices and asset price volatility of the Markov equilibrium under the
complete markets benchmark. Consider ￿rst what happens with complete markets: Asset
price does depend on the wealth distribution b !
O
t and its evolution. However, in the long
run b !
O
t converges to 0 or to 1 depending on whether the pessimists or the optimists hold
the correct belief. Therefore, in the long run, asset price only depends on the exogenous
states. But given the constant aggregate endowment across the exogenous states and I.I.D.
36shocks, asset price converges to a constant and asset price volatility converges to zero in the
long run. In the short run, as the wealth distribution also moves over time under complete
markets, asset price volatility might be very large.
In the case of Markov equilibrium under incomplete markets, however, consumers with
incorrect beliefs, the optimists, are protected by the collateral constraint. They always
survive in equilibrium, and constantly speculate on asset prices. First, asset price is not
only state dependent but also depends on the wealth of the optimists. Second, their wealth
undergoes large swings as they lose or win their bet after each period. The two components
contribute to the volatility of asset price compared to the complete markets case. In general,
it depends on the correlation of the two components, that we might have asset price volatility
higher or lower under incomplete versus under complete markets. However, again, given the
assumption of constant aggregate endowment and I.I.D. shocks, the ￿rst component has
negligible e⁄ects on asset prices. Thus the second component dominates and makes asset
price volatility under incomplete markets higher than the it is under complete markets in
the long run.
I measure price volatility as one-period ahead standard deviation of price. This measure
is the discrete time equivalence of the continuous instant volatility, see for example Xiong
and Yan (2009). Figure 7 shows the evolution of asset price volatility under the two cases,
the optimists with high or low non ￿nancial wealth. The ￿gure shows that, in the short run,
asset price might be more or less volatile under complete markets than under incomplete
markets, depending on the relative non-￿nancial wealth of agents. However, in the long
run, as the optimists are driven out in the complete markets equilibrium; that makes asset
price volatility converge to zero. This property does not hold under in the incomplete
markets equilibrium, the overly optimistic agents constantly speculate on asset price using
the same asset as collateral. Asset price becomes more volatile than in the complete markets
equilibrium, given that the wealth of the optimists constantly change as they win or loose
their bets.
Strikingly, the smaller the non-￿nancial wealth of the optimist is, the higher the short-
run asset price volatility in the incomplete markets equilibrium but the lower the short-run
asset price volatility in the complete markets equilibrium. This is because, under complete
markets, it takes less time to drive out the optimists if they have lower non-￿nancial wealth.
As we increase the non-￿nancial wealth of the optimists, we increase the short-run volatility
of asset price with complete markets and decrease the short-run volatility of asset price with
incomplete markets. Figure 7 plots the average asset price volatility over time for complete
markets (dashed lines) and for incomplete markets (solid lines) equilibria, with di⁄erent
levels of "non-￿nancial wealth" of the optimists (low and high). This ￿gure shows that,
above some certain level of non-￿nancial wealth of the optimists, in the short-run asset price
is more volatile under complete markets. But in the long run, the reverse inequality holds
(right panel).
5.2.4 The ￿nancial crisis 2007-2008
Geanakoplos (2009) argues that the introduction of credit default swap (CDS) triggered the
￿nancial crisis 2007-2008. The reason is that the introduction of CDS moves the markets






































Figure 7: Asset Price Volatility Over Time
I do the same exercise here by simulating a ￿nancial markets equilibrium in its stationary
state from time t = 0 until time t = 50.36 At t = 51 markets suddenly become complete. In
Figure 8, the left panel plots asset price level and the right panel plots asset price volatility
over time. The simulation shows that asset price decreases but asset price volatility increases
in the short run after the introduction of CDS. The reason for the fall in asset price is that the
pessimists can now "leverage their view" with a complete set of ￿nancial assets. The reason
for increasing asset price volatility in the short run is the movement in the wealth distribution
toward the long-run wealth distribution, which concentrates on pessimists. Nevertheless in




























































Figure 8: Financial Crisis 2007-2008
36In order to generate high short-run asset price volatility, I choose a high level of the optimists￿endowment
eO = 10:
38Figure 9: Evolution of the Aggregate States
5.2.5 Dynamic leverage cycles
Even though the example in Subsection 5.2.3 generates high asset price volatility, leverage
is not consistent with what we observe in ￿nancial markets: high leverage in good times and
low leverage in bad times, as documented in Geanakoplos (2009).
In order to generate the procyclicality of leverage, I use the insight from Geanakoplos
(2009) regarding aggregate uncertainty: bad news must generate more uncertainty and more
disagreement in order to reduce equilibrium leverage signi￿cantly. To formalize this type of
news, I assume that after a series of good shocks, the ￿rst bad shock does not immediately
reduce dividends. After this bad shock, however, dividends plunge if a second bad shock hits
the economy. Therefore the ￿rst bad shock only increases uncertainty regarding dividends
but not their level. In a dynamic setting, the formulation translates to a dividend process
that depends not only on current exogenous shock but also on the last period exogenous
shock. Therefore we need to use four exogenous shocks, instead of the two exogenous shocks
in the last subsections:
s 2 fGG;GB;BG;BBg:
Figure 9, left panel, shows that the initial bad shocks following a series of good shocks does
not reduce dividends. However, dividends fall to 0:2, if a second bad shock hits the economy,
i.e., the ￿rst bad shock increases uncertainty in dividends. The right panel of the ￿gure shows
the evolution through time of the exogenous states using Markov chain representation.
This uncertainty structure generates high leverage at good states GG and BG and low
leverage in bad states GB and BB: Figure 10 shows this pattern of leverage. The dashed
line represents leverage level in good states s = GG or BG as a function of the normalized
wealth distribution. The two solid lines represent leverage level in bad states s = GB or
BB.
In addition to the fact that uncertainty a⁄ects leverage emphasized in Geanakoplos
(2009), we also learn from Figure 10 that ￿nancial wealth distribution is another impor-
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s = GB
s = BB
Figure 10: Leverage Cycles
tant determinant of leverage. For example, we learn from the ￿gure that leverage decreases
dramatically from good states to bad states. However, in contrast to the static version in
Geanakoplos (2009), changes in the wealth distribution do not amplify the decline in leverage
from good states to bad states as leverage is insensitive to the wealth distribution in bad
states.
Moreover, this version of dynamic leverage cycles generates a pattern of leverage build-up
in good times. Good shocks increase leverage as they increase the wealth of the optimists
relative to the wealth of the pessimists and leverage is increasing the wealth of the optimists.
Figure 11 shows the evolution of the wealth distribution and leverage over time. The economy
starts at good state and !O = 0. It experiences 9 consecutive good shocks from t = 1 to 9
and two bad shocks at t = 10;11 then another 9 good shocks from t = 12 to 20. This ￿gure
shows that, in good states, both the wealth of the optimists and leverage increase. However
their wealth and leverage plunge when bad shocks hit the economy.
5.2.6 Regulating Leverage
Subsection 5.2.3 shows that, in a incomplete markets equilibrium, when the non-￿nancial
wealth of the optimists is small relative to asset prices, variations in their wealth play an
important role in driving up asset price volatility. It is then tempting to conclude that by
restricting leverage, we can reduce the variation of wealth of the optimists, therefore reduce
asset price volatility. However, this simple intuition is not always true by two reasons. First,
restricting leverage limits the demand for asset of the optimists when their "￿nancial wealth"
is small, therefore drives down asset price. In contrast, when their "￿nancial wealth" is large,
restricting leverage does not a⁄ect the demand, thus does not a⁄ect asset price. The two
channels create a potential for higher asset price volatility. Second, restricting leverage does












































































Figure 11: Leverage Cycles
reduce asset price in the short run when the optimists are poor, however in the long run they
can accumulate the asset and become wealthier. High leverage requirements prevent them
from falling back to the low wealth region. So in the long run, restricting leverage drives up
asset price volatility due to the ￿rst reason and high long run wealth of the optimists.
To show this statement, I go to the extreme case, when leverage is strictly forbidden,
i.e., there are no ￿nancial assets. Figure 12 plots the volatility of asset price as functions
of the ￿nancial wealth of the optimists in two cases, with ￿nancial markets and without
￿nancial markets37. We can see that, with ￿nancial markets, asset volatility is higher when
the optimists are poor and lower when they are rich. The reverse holds without ￿nancial
markets. The numerical solution also shows that, without ￿nancial markets, the optimists
always accumulate assets to move up to the high ￿nancial wealth (asset holding) region.38
This dynamics makes asset price more volatile without ￿nancial markets then it is with
￿nancial markets.
Figure 13 shows the Monte-Carlo simulation for an economy starting in good state and
!O = 0. The ￿gure plots the evolution of the average of the normalized ￿nancial wealth
of the optimists, left panel, and asset price volatility, right panel, over time (the solid lines
represent the unregulated economy and the dashed lines represent the regulated economy).
As discussed above, the wealth of the optimists remains low on average in the unregulated
economy but increases to a permanently high level under regulation. Thus, initially asset
37Without ￿nancial market, "￿nancial wealth" is asset holding itself.
38With leverage, the optimists will want to hold more of the real assets using leverage, but given that they
have incorrect beliefs, they will tend to lose all their shares. Notice that consumption patterns are pretty
similar with or without leverage. The main di⁄erence between the two equilibria is the asset holdings.







































Figure 12: Asset Price Volatility in Unregulated and Regulated Economies
price volatility is higher in the unregulated economy than in the regulated economy. The
reverse inequality holds, however, as over time, the wealth of the optimists increase more in
the regulated economy than in the unregulated economy.
I conclude this part with two additional remarks. First, intermediate regulations can
be computed using Proposition 8. If the regulator requires collateral k ￿ kr, then the
proposition shows that in equilibrium, only the leverage level max(k￿
t;kr) prevails. The
numerical solutions for intermediate regulations con￿rms the conclusion in the paragraphs
above. Second, regulation not only fails to reduce asset price volatility, it also reduces welfare
of both types of agents as it reduces trading possibilities.
6 General model with capital accumulation
To study the e⁄ects of beliefs heterogeneity on the real economy, i.e., with aggregate capital
accumulation and production, I introduce a second type of physical assets: assets in ￿ exible
supply.
6.1 Assets with ￿xed and ￿ exible supplies
Adjustment cost: The set of A is decomposed into two subsets, A = A0[A1, one with elastic
supply assets, A0, associated with adjustment cost functions, and the other ones with ￿xed
supply, a 2 A1 generating divided as described in Section 2. Let A0;A1 respectively denote
the numbers of assets with elastic and ￿xed supply.
We can think of assets with ￿xed supply, a 2 A1, as having in￿nite adjustment costs,
however for the rigorousness of the model, I treat them di⁄erently from the assets with elastic
supply.







































































































Figure 13: Wealth Distribution and Asset Price Volatility over Time
For each asset with elastic supply, a 2 A0, in each period, kn
a new units of asset a can
be produced using ko
a old units of asset a and ￿a (kn
a;ko
a) units of the ￿nal good. The kn
a
new units are used for production in the next period. Let qa;t denote the ex-dividend price
of each old unit of asset a, and q￿
a;t denote the price of each new unit of asset a. Notice that
￿a (kn
a;ko
a) is the ￿nal good investment associated to asset a. One example typically used in







a ￿ (1 ￿ ￿a)k
o
a: (33)



















in which 0 < ￿a < minf2(1 ￿ ￿a);1g.
We can also rewrite the adjustment cost under a more familiar form
k
n











in which ia is real investment in terms of ￿nal good. ￿(:) is strictly increasing and weakly
concave. The perfectly investment case in (33) corresponds to ￿(x) = x.
I make the following standard assumption on the adjustment cost function. This assump-
tion ensures that the pro￿t maximization of each asset producer yields upper-hemicontinous
and convex solutions.
43Assumption 6 The adjustment cost function ￿a is homogeneous of degree 1 and convex in
(kn
a;￿ko
a). Moreover, ￿a is strictly increasing in kn
a and strictly decreasing in ko
a.
Production: Assets with ￿xed supply, a 2 A1 generate a state-dependent stream of
dividend da (s): An asset a with elastic supply can be used as an input in production with
a state-dependent production function Fa (Ka;La;s), in which Ka are units of assets of type
a and La is labor of the type associated to the asset.
Similarly to the adjustment cost, I make the following standard assumption to ensure
that the pro￿t maximization of each ￿nal good producer yields upper-hemicontinuous and
convex solutions.
Assumption 7 The production function Fa (Ka;La;s) is homogeneous of degree 1 and con-
cave in (Ka;La) and strictly increasing in both parameters.
One example is the standard Cobb-Douglas production function with state-dependent
productivity used in the RBC literature





Beside the group of consumers in Section 2, there are two other groups of agents in this
economy: the asset producers and the ￿nal good producers. These producers live only for
one period, therefore they do not have to make inter-temporal decisions.39
Asset Producers: In each state, there are A0 representative asset producers. Asset
producer a 2 A0 produces Kn
a;t unit of new asset from Ko







units of ￿nal good. The producers take prices q￿















a;t ￿  a;t ￿ qa;tK
o
a;t￿1: (35)
Final Good Producers: In each state there is also A0 representative ￿nal good pro-
ducers. Producer a 2 A0 produces Fa (Ka;La;s) units of ￿nal good from Ka units of asset
a and La units of labor associated to the asset40. The producers take rental prices da;t and












a;t ￿ wa;tLa;t (36)
The consumers are still the main actors in this economy. Consumers h are endowed with
a vector of labor
Lh = (Lh;a (st))a2A0 ;
39See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Chapter 12, for a similar reformulation of the standard stochastic
growth models, using two types of ￿rms. Type 1 ￿rms produce consumption good using labor and capital.
Type 2 ￿rms produce capital good using consumption good. The two types of ￿rms corresponds to ￿nal
good producers and asset producers in my model.
40In an alternative model, assets use the same type of labor. That model is similar to the one presented
here.
44Lh;a corresponds to labor associated with asset a in ￿ exible supply.
The consumer maximizes her intertemporal expected utility with the per period utility
function Uh (:;:) : R+ ￿ (R+)
A0 ￿! R satis￿es
Assumption 8 Uh is concave and strictly increasing in (c;￿l).










































































and the collateral constraints (5).
In the budget constraint (37), consumer h can trade old units of real asset a at price qa;t,
buy new units of asset kh
a;t for time t + 1 at price q￿
a;t. Finally, she works at the wage wa;t
in each production sector a. She also receives her shares of pro￿t from the asset producer
and ￿nal good producer at time t, ￿h
a and ￿f;h
a . However, given the homogeneity of the
production functions, these pro￿ts should be zero in equilibrium.
Within a period, timing of decisions and actions taken by the agents are summarized in
the following ￿gure:
A number of features are worth noting in this setup: The demand of the consumers for
new assets is similar to Tobin￿ s Q theory of investment. They weigh the perceived marginal
45bene￿t of one additional unit of an asset a: future rental price, da;t+1, and future resale value
qa;t+1, against the marginal cost of buying one new unit of that asset at price q￿
a;t. The total
demand for new units of asset a from the consumers is decreasing in price q￿
a;t and the supply
of the asset from the asset producers is increasing in q￿
a;t. In equilibrium both q￿
a;t and Kn
a;t
are determined simultaneously. For instance, if the consumers expect low future resale price
of an asset, they will demand less for new units of the asset. This low demand leads to low
current price and low investment in the asset.
In this environment, I de￿ne an equilibrium as follows

































































































satisfying the following conditions
i) Asset markets and labor market for each asset with elastic supply a 2 A0 in each period
clear:































































































maximization problem subject to the budget constraint, (37), and the collateral constraint,
(5). Asset producers and ￿nal good producers maximize their pro￿t as in (35) and (36).
The case in which there is only one asset with perfect elastic supply, i.e., adjustment cost
described in (33) and no ￿nancial assets corresponds to Krusell and Smith (1998)￿ s model as
we allow for both aggregate shocks and incorporate idiosyncratic shocks to each individual
in each exogenous shock s 2 S, and allow for a large number of agents. Therefore we can
apply the existence proof in section 3 to show the existence of the recursive equilibrium in
their original paper.
As a benchmark I also study equilibria under complete ￿nancial markets. Consumers can
borrow and lend freely by buying and selling Arrow-Debreu state contingent securities, only
subject to the no-Ponzi condition. In each node st; there are S ￿nancial securities. Financial
security s deliver one unit of ￿nal good if state s happens at time t + 1 and zero otherwise.
Let ps;t denote time t price and let ￿
h
s;t (st) denote consumer h￿ s holding of this security. The





















































De￿nition 5 A complete markets equilibrium is de￿ned similarly to incomplete markets
equilibrium except that each consumer solves her individual maximization problem subject to
the budget constraint (38) and the no-Ponzi condition, instead of the collateral constraint
(5).
476.2 Markov Equilibrium
6.2.1 The state space











a (qa;t + da;t)Ko
a;t￿1
:





As in Section 3, in equilibrium ! (st) always lies in the (H-1)-dimensional simplex ￿, i.e.,
!h ￿ 0 and
PH
h=1 !h = 1. I will show that, under conditions detailed in Subsubsection 6.2.3
below, there exists a Markov equilibrium over a compact state space. I look for an equilibrium



















are the total old units of assets with elastic supply at the beginning of a period.
Let the state space X consist of all exogenous and endogenous variables that occur in
the economy at some node ￿, i.e., X = S ￿V, where S is the ￿nite set of exogenous shocks
and V is the set of all possible endogenous variables.
In each node ￿, an element v (￿) 2 V includes: the normalized wealth distribution
(!h (￿))h2H 2 ￿, the total old units of assets with elastic supply (Ko
a)a2A0 2 E; together











h2H : It also
includes the 4A0 current prices of new units of elastic supply assets, the prices of old units
of these assets, the rental prices and wages associated with these assets
(q
￿
a (￿);qa (￿);wa (￿);da (￿))a2A0 ;
and A1 prices of assets with ￿xed supply (qa (￿))a2A1. Finally it includes J prices of the
￿nancial assets (pj (￿))j2J. Therefore V =￿ ￿ E ￿ b V with














the set of endogenous variables other than the wealth distribution and total old quantities
of assets with elastic supply.
Finally, let X ￿ V denote the set of vectors of all the endogenous variables that satis￿es:
1) ￿nancial and asset markets clears, 2) producers maximize their pro￿t and 3) the budget
















































a; e La;e ya ￿ 0





e ya ￿ da e K
f
a ￿ wae ya (41)
and consumers￿budget constraints hold with equality4142
c
h = e
h + w ￿ l + !
h (q + d) ￿ K
o ￿ q
￿ ￿ k ￿ p ￿ ￿. (42)




















6.2.2 Markov Equilibrium De￿nition
In order to de￿ne a Markov equilibrium, I use the same de￿nition of expectation correspon-















a (q+ + d+)
￿
P
a (q+ + d+) ￿ K+ :
De￿nition 6 A Markov equilibrium consists of a (non-empty valued) policy correspondence,
P, and a transition function F
P : S ￿ ￿ ￿ E￿b V
and
F : graph(P) ￿! V
S
such that graph(P) ￿ X and for all x 2 graph(P) and all s 2 S we have F (x) ￿ g (x) and
(s;Fs (x)) 2 graph(P).
Lemma 4 A Markov equilibrium is an incomplete markets equilibrium according to De￿ni-
tion 4.
Proof. This result is similar to the one in Du¢ e, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan
(1994). We only need to show that the ￿rst order conditions as represented by Lagrange
multipliers are su¢ cient to ensure the optimal solution of the consumers. This holds because
the optimization each consumer faces is a convex maximization problem.
41With some abuse of notation, we use q￿
a = qa for a 2 A1.
42Pro￿t maximization conditions (40) and (41) imply zero pro￿ts from the producers, hence the absence
of these pro￿ts in the consumers￿budget constraint.
496.2.3 Existence and Property of Markov Equilibrium
I need the following assumptions, in addition to Assumption 5 in Subsection 3.3, evaluated
at the upper bound of the total supply of ￿ exible supply assets de￿ned below.








































The ￿rst assumption ensures that total quantities of elastic-supply assets are bounded.
For example, when we have only one elastic-supply asset and its supply is perfectly elastic,
i.e., the adjustment cost function is given by the ￿ exible investment function (33) and the
associated production is Cobb-Douglas with ￿a 2 (0;1). Then inequality (43) is equivalent
to






which must be true for Ka large enough. This is also the way one obtains an upper bound
for capital in a neoclassical growth model. The second assumption ensures that prices of
new and old assets are bounded in equilibrium as they correspond to the ￿rst-derivatives of








@Ko = ￿(1 ￿ ￿a):
The details of the existence proof are in Appendix B.
Proposition 9 When aggregate endowment and aggregate productivity are constant, and
shocks are I.I.D., long run investment volatility is higher under incomplete markets than it
is under complete markets.
Proof. In the long run, under complete markets, the economy converges to the one with
homogenous beliefs because agents with incorrect beliefs will eventually be driven out of the
markets. We can thus ￿nd a representative agent. Standard arguments for representative
agent economy imply that asset prices are constant and levels of investment converge to their
steady state levels. When we have assets in elastic supply, but with constant productivity,
50as in the neoclassical growth model, the total quantity of an asset a in ￿xed supply should
converge to the steady-state level K￿


















and therefore the investment associated to this asset converges to I￿
a = ￿a (K￿
a;K￿
a):
Hence, under complete markets, asset price volatility and investment volatility converge to
zero in the long run. Under incomplete markets, asset price volatility and investment volatil-
ity remain well above zero as aggregate shocks constantly change the wealth distribution,
which, in turn, changes asset prices and investment.
6.2.4 Relationship to recursive equilibria
When we do not have ￿nancial assets and there is only one real asset, then Markov equilibria
are recursive equilibria. This is also true when initially agents hold the same fraction of each
assets. However, in general, Markov equilibria are not recursive equilibria. But in Kubler
and Schmedders (2003), subsection 4.4 shows that we can construct recursive equilibria from
Markov equilibria if we can extract a continuous mapping from the policy correspondence.
As an important special case discussed after De￿nition 1 of incomplete markets equilib-
rium, the economy in Krusell and Smith (1998) corresponds to the economy here with one
asset in perfectly elastic supply and without ￿nancial markets. The existence of a Markov
equilibrium implies the existence of a recursive equilibrium. Indeed, given that there are no





the fraction of capital asset holding. Together with the total quantity of capital, Ka;t, the







, the aggregate state and capital
holdings of each agent in the de￿nition of recursive equilibria, in page 874 of Krusell and
Smith (1998). In a recent paper, Miao (2006) shows the existence of recursive equilibrium
however he has to include future expected discounted utilities of agents in the state-space. In
addition, he wrote in page 291, that the question whether a recursive equilibrium in Krusell
and Smith (1998) exists remains an open question. The existence proof here suggests a
positive answer to that question under the form of "generalized recursive equilibrium". A
"generalized recursive equilibrium" might not be a simple recursive equilibrium because the
mapping might be multi-valued.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to examine the e⁄ects of belief
heterogeneity on the survival of agents and on asset price and investment volatility under
di⁄erent ￿nancial markets structures. I show that, when ￿nancial markets are endogenously
incomplete, agents with incorrect beliefs survive in the long run. The survival of these
agents leads to higher asset price and investment volatility. This result contrasts with the
frictionless complete markets case, in which agents holding incorrect beliefs are eventually
driven out and as a result, asset prices and investment exhibit lower volatility.
51In addition, I show the existence of stationary Markov equilibria in this framework with
incomplete ￿nancial markets and with general production and capital accumulation technol-
ogy. I also develop an algorithm for computing the equilibria. As a result, the framework
can be readily used to investigate questions about the interaction between ￿nancial markets
and the macroeconomy. For instance, it would be interesting in future work to apply these
methods in calibration exercises using more rigorous quantitative asset pricing techniques,
such as in Alvarez and Jermann (2001). This could be done by allowing for uncertainty in
the growth rate of dividends rather than uncertainty in the levels, as modeled in this paper,
in order to match the rate of return on stock markets and the growth rate of aggregate
consumption. Such a model would provide a set of moment conditions that could be used
to estimate relevant parameters using GMM as in Chien and Lustig (2009). A challenge in
such work, however, is that ￿nding the Markov equilibria is computationally demanding. I
follow that path in Cao, Chen, and Scott (2011).
A second avenue for further research is to examine more normative questions in the
framework developed in this paper. My results suggest, for example, that ￿nancial regulation
aimed at reducing asset price and real investment volatility should be state-depedent, as
conjectured by Geanakoplos (2009). It would also be interesting to consider the e⁄ects of
other intervention policies, such as bail-out or monetary policies.
528 Appendices
Appendix A: Analysis of survival and disappearance under complete markets.
Proof of Proposition 1. This is an application of Proposition 2 in Sandroni (2000). We need
















The fact that P a.s. limt￿!1
Ph(st)
P(st) for any h exists follow from Lemma 2 in his paper, using the
Martingale Convergence Theorem. Now in order to prove that agents with ￿h 6= ￿ will not make
accurate predictions. We show that, almost surely, there exists a sequence st ￿




￿. Let ￿h (s;s0) 6= ￿ (s;s0) then in￿nitely often st will reach s as S is an ergodic set. For st such
that st = s let A be the set st+1 = s
￿ ￿









￿ > ￿ > 0 (44)
Notice that we cannot directly apply Propositions 3,4, and 5 in Sandroni (2000) as they require
(44) holds for all t. But at some t when ￿ (st;:) = ￿h (st;:) the two probabilities are actually the
same so (44) does not hold. This case is prevalent when we have time varying beliefs dispersion,
in which people share common beliefs in normal times.
Proof of Propostion 4. The asset price is the presented discounted value of dividends weighted



















































































































This is asset price in an complete markets economy.43
Appendix B: Existence proof
To prove the existence of equilibrium in ￿nite horizon, I allow utility to be dependent
of labor decision. So per period utility of agent h is Uh (c;Lh ￿ l) : (R+)
2 ￿! R over
consumption and leisure. I replace Assumption 3 by the following Assumption
Assumption 3b: Uh (c;l) is strictly increasing in c, non-decreasing in l and concave in
(c;l):











































together with the no default penalty de￿ned in (1), is attainable if consumptions, real asset holdings,
labor decision from the consumers, new and old real assets decision from the real asset producers















































= 0) and excess demands are negative:



















































































j;t ￿ 0: (45)





a;0 ￿ Ka;￿1 ￿ 0:
in each time-state t;st with 0 < t < T. For the initial period there is no explicit initial debt

























a;0 ￿ Ka;￿1 ￿ 0
K
o
a;0 ￿ Ka;￿1 ￿ 0
K
f











j;0 ￿ 0: (46)







































































a;T ￿ 0: (47)






















Lemma 5 The set of attainable allocations is bounded.
Proof. We prove this Lemma by induction in t.















































Step 1 t 7￿! t+1: Suppose there is an Mt such that for each attainable allocation associates with



































we show that the statement holds at t + 1 ￿ T by using the system of inequalities (45) and (47):























































































































t+1 ￿ 0; for a 2 A0









































































































































are bounded by Mt+1:
Step 2 t = 0 : Similarly proof using (46).
Proof of Theorem 2. In this proof, we allow for non-trivial labor choice decision, by supposing
that the utility function of each consumer is concave over consumption and leisure Uh (c;l) in
Assumption 3b. We restrict choices of produces and consumers to [￿2MT;2MT];(keeping bond





from above. To simplify the proof, we switch from the ￿nal good as numeraire to the following
normalization:
























































































































to the excess demand in each market in each time-state pair









7￿! z = (excess demands) (48)
The component of the excess demand in each market corresponds to the component of the price
system in that market. When ￿ 2
￿
￿￿T￿1￿
￿ there is one market for ￿nal good, A1 markets for assets
with ￿xed supply and 4A0 markets corresponding to new units, old units for asset production, old
units for production and labor market for each asset with elastic supply, and ￿nally J market for
￿nancial securities. When ￿ 2
￿ ￿￿T￿ ￿ there are no markets for ￿nancial securities nor new units of
assets.
In Lemma 7, we establish that Z is upper hemi-continuous and compact, convex-valued. Given
each individual choice is bounded, Z is bounded for example by a closed cube K of
R
(1+A1+4A0+J)k￿T￿1k+(1+3A0)k￿Tn￿T￿1k:




























￿fe p ￿ zg ￿ Z (p):
Since z is an upper hemi-continous correspondence, with non-empty, compact convex value. Kaku-


































for sT 2 ￿Tn￿T￿1



















































for each t ￿ T ￿ 1: Notice that for t = 0
PH
h=1 ￿h
j;￿1 = 0 and
PH
h=1 kh
a;￿1 = Ka;￿1 . For the









































































































































































































































































fe p ￿ ztg
we have (by choosing e p in the corner of ￿ or ￿f depending on whether t < T) zt ￿ 0 for each
time-state pair t;st: In Lemma 5, the choices are bounded by MT therefore the arti￿cial bound
2MT is not binding. Now we can show that prices are strictly positive:
1) pc
t > 0 otherwise ch
t will reach the arti￿cial bound 2MT, which contradicts the fact that the
bound is not binding. Similarly
2) Given pc
t > 0, da;t > 0 otherwise K
f
a;t will reach the arti￿cial bound.
3) Given da;t+1 > 0, q￿
a;t > 0 (for a 2 A1 q￿
a;t = qa;t) otherwise k
h
a;t will reach the arti￿cial bound.
4) Given pc
t > 0, qa;t > 0 otherwise K
o
a;t will reach the arti￿cial bound.
5) If wa;t = 0 then Lt = 2La;l
h
a;t ￿ Lh
a which contradicts the negative excess demand in the labor
markets, so wa;t > 0.
6) Finally if pb
j;t = 0 then ￿
h




j;t+1 = HB > 0; which
contradicts the negative excess demand in the ￿nancial market for asset j:






t > 0 also implies budget constraints, and therefore (49) and (50) hold with equality, so markets
must clear. The collateral constraints (5) implies that if ￿j;t < 0 then ￿￿jt < MT
kj;a, where kj;a =
mins2S kj;a (s) > k. Therefore if ￿h
j;t > 0; ￿h
j;t < (H ￿ 1) MT
kj;a: We can choose MT independent of B,
so we can choose B such that B = (H ￿ 1) MT
kj;a; this arti￿cial constraint will not be binding. To
conclude, observing that in this ￿xed point, all the arti￿cial bounds are slack: we have thus found
an equilibrium.
Lemma 6 (Walras￿Law) Given that consumers, ￿rms optimize subject to their constraints,
we obtain inequalities (49) and (50).


































































So, moving endowment in ￿nal good eh



























































































t a;t ￿ qa;tKo
a;t:







a;t (qa;t + da;t):
Plugging these equalities into, (51) we obtain exactly the inequality (49). The inequality (50) is
obtained similarly.
Lemma 7 Z de￿ned in (48) is upper hemi-continuous and compact, convex-valued.
Proof. These properties are standard.
Proof of Lemma 3. Given any equilibrium, let ￿a;t denote the Lagrange multipliers associated
to the collateral constraints, (5) in the consumers￿ optimization problem. First we show that
consumptions are bounded from above and below: Market clearing condition implies ch
t ￿ e. Second




































































a;t = Ka;t ￿ Ka





















Since ￿a is increasing in the ￿rst parameters, we have
Ka;t+1 ￿ Ka:
























































































da;t+1 = Fa;K (Ka;t+1;La)





Similarly we have bounds w and w for wa;t+1.





otherwise there will be a consumer that holds at least
Ka;￿1
H units of asset a at st after paying-o⁄
her debt. This consumer can sell part of her holding to pay-o⁄ debt and consume the rest of the
sale. This strategy would give her more expected utility than her current one. This contradicts the




















































































The ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿j;t+1 implies for an agent h with ￿h






































































otherwise it is more than enough to simultaneously buy assets and sell security j, the aggregate
demand of ￿j will be strictly negative. Also because of the market clearing condition we have
0 ￿ kh






















j;t ￿ ￿(H ￿ 1)￿
j = ￿j:
Proof of Theorem 2. Let the compact set T ￿ b V denote the set over which the equilibrium
endogenous variables of the ￿nite horizon economies lie and E is de￿ned such that the set of
equilibrium total units of assets always lie in E as well. For each correspondence V : S￿￿￿E￿ T




b v 2 T such that (s;!;K;v) 2 X: 9(vs)s2S 2 g (s;!;K;v)
such that 8s0 b vs0 2 V (s0;!0) in which vs0 = (!0;K0;b vs0)
￿
Let V 0 = T and V n+1 = GT (V n). In Lemma 8 below, we show that V n+1 is a non-empty
correspondence for all n ￿ 0. We have W (s;!;K) is not empty and W (s;!;K) ￿ V 0 = T :It is
also easy to show that
V (s;!;K) ￿ V 0 (s;!;K)
for all (s;!;K) 2 S ￿ ￿ ￿ E (denote V ￿ V 0) then the same inclusion holds for W and W0: By
de￿nition V 1 ￿ V 0 so by induction we can show V n+1 ￿ V n.Therefore we have obtained a sequence
of decreasing compact sets. Let




Then V ￿ is a non-empty correspondence and GT (V ￿) ￿ V ￿. Since graph of g is closed, we have
that GT (V ￿) is non-empty as well. Let V ￿ be the ￿ policy correspondence￿and
z￿ (s;!;K;v) =
￿
(vs)s2S 2 g (s;!;K;v) such that
8s0 b vs0 2 V ￿ (s0;!0) where vs0 = (!0;K0;b vs0)
￿
:
Then (V ￿;z￿) is a Markov equilibrium.
Lemma 8 V n+1 is a non-empty correspondence for all n ￿ 0.
65Proof. For each n, consider the equilibrium constructed in Lemma 2 for the initial condition
(s;!;K) it is easy to show that the resulting allocation at time 0 belong to V n (s;!;K). For




and qa;wa;da are de￿ned as in that construction. We also add kh
a = 0, Ka = 0 and ￿h
j = 0 the
other allocations are de￿ned in the construction as well. Then (s1;vs1) 2 X. It easy to see that
(vs)s2S 2 g (s;!;K;v). Also b vs1 2 V (s1;!1) by de￿nition.
Appendix C: Algorithms





We ￿nd the mapping ￿ from that state space into the set of current prices and investment levels
fqa;q￿
a;wa;da;Kn








, and fpsgsS the Arrow-
Debreu state prices. There are therefore 5A0 + A1 + SH + S unknowns.
First, notice that lh;a = Lh
a.








































This gives another A0 equations.










Regarding ps, the inter-temporal Euler equation implies









































which give other S equations. With these 5A0 + A1 + SH + S equations, we can solve for the
5A0 + A1 + SH + S unknowns. That solution determines the mapping T￿:
In order to ￿nd an equilibrium corresponding to an initial asset holdings (￿h;a)h2H;a2A we ￿nd the
value of stream of consumption and endowment of each consumers
V h












Then we solve for H unknowns (ch)h2H using H equations
V h



















consumptions and fpsgsS the Arrow-Debreu state prices. In total we have HS unknowns. Notice
that we need to keep track of the consumption of only H ￿ 1 consumers. The consumption of the
remaining consumer is determined by the market clearing condition




The intertemporal Euler equation implies









that give HS equations. From these HS equations we can solve for the HS unknowns. When we
have CRRA utility functions, we can solve for closed form solutions of ps and c+
h :
Algorithm 2 (Algorithm to Compute Incomplete Markets Equilibria) We look for



















































67The variables with superscript +,q+
a ;d+






a;n+1 if a 2 A0













































The budget constraints of the consumers hold with equality
ch
n+1 = eh (s) + !h (qn+1 + dn+1) ￿ K ￿ q￿
n+1 ￿ kh
n+1 + wn+1 ￿ lh
n+1 ￿ pn+1 ￿ ￿h
n+1



















a;n+1 = Lh;a and La;n+1 =
P
h2H lh
a;n+1. Finally, the future wealth distributions are consistent















a;n+1 (q+ + d+)
o
P
a (q+ + d+) ￿ Kn+1
again the variables with superscript +, q+
s ;d+
s , are determined using the mapping ￿n.
Appendix D: One asset economy


















We are considering the set of debt assets that promise 1 in both states and requires k unit of the
real asset as collateral. The price of such an asset is pk
681. k < 1
u; then this asset is essentially the real asset because its e⁄ective pay-o⁄ is (ku;kd)
2.1
d ￿ k ￿ 1
u. Then the pay-o⁄ to the borrower of the asset is
(ku ￿ 1;0)
and he has to pay kq ￿ pk: she buys k real asset but she get pk from selling the ￿nancial asset. So
the borrowers only choose k such that
ku ￿ 1
kq ￿ pk














will be chosen by borrowers in equilibrium.
Consider an actively traded ￿nancial asset with collateral level k￿ belonging to the argmax set








Otherwise, due to collateral value of the real asset, buyers of this asset will strictly prefer the
portfolio ku￿1
k￿u￿1 units of ￿nancial asset k￿ and k￿￿k
k￿u￿1 units of the real asset. This portfolio gives the




























Thus every seller of this asset k will strictly prefer selling asset k￿.
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